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SWEETHEART DEALS, DEFERRED 
PROSECUTION, AND MAKING A MOCKERY OF 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: U.S. 
Corporate DPAs Rejected on Many Fronts 
Peter R. Reilly* 
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) are contracts 
negotiated between the federal government and defendants to address 
allegations of corporate misconduct without going to trial. The agreements 
are hailed as a model of speedy and efficient law enforcement, but also 
derided as making a “mockery” of America’s criminal justice system 
stemming from lenient deals being offered to some defendants. This Article 
questions why corporate DPAs are not given meaningful judicial review 
when such protection is required for other alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) tools, including plea bargains, settlement agreements, and consent 
decrees. The Article also analyzes several cases in which federal district 
courts express misgivings about having to approve, in accordance with 
recent appellate court rulings, DPAs they would otherwise have likely 
rejected for being overly lenient. Finally, the Article describes how several 
foreign countries have turned away from using U.S.-style corporate DPAs in 
favor of fashioning their own programs with mechanisms to ensure effective 
transparency, judicial oversight, and public interest accountability. The 
Article tracks the myriad ways in which critical rule-of-law elements have 
been integrated into these burgeoning corporate DPA programs worldwide, 
thereby providing models of how the United States and other countries can 
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  INTRODUCTION 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements (DPAs) “occupy an important middle ground between declining 
prosecution and obtaining the conviction of a corporation.”1 The agreements 
are negotiated contracts between the government and corporate entities 
accused of possible misconduct.2  In broad terms, when the government 
alleges transgression, the entity is required to admit wrongdoing, cooperate 
with the government, pay a financial penalty, and bolster corporate 
compliance programs to avoid future misconduct.3  In exchange, the 
government agrees to hold prosecution in abeyance for a set time period 
(usually several years), thereby giving the accused entity an opportunity to 
fulfill the terms of the agreement.4 In the end, if all the provisions of the DPA 
are successfully achieved, the government will set aside the prosecution and 
not pursue the matter again.5 
DPAs were first used in the United States in the early 1900s as a way to 
quickly and efficiently address low-level misdemeanor crimes like retail 
theft—especially when committed by juveniles or first-time offenders.6 The 
agreements were oftentimes combined with counseling, training, and job-
placement programs to assist the defendant.7 The use of DPAs in addressing 
                                                                                                                            
 1. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.200 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-
organizations#9-28.200 [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. 
 2. See Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should 
Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 77, 80 n.16 (2006) (“DPAs are essentially contracts between the government and a 
corporate criminal in which the government agrees not to prosecute a corporation in return for a 
list of concessions.”). 
 3. Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in 
Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 47 (2010); Julie R. O’Sullivan, How 
Prosecutors Apply the “Federal Prosecutions of Corporations” Charging Policy in the Era of 
Deferred Prosecutions, and What That Means for the Purposes of the Federal Criminal Sanction, 
51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 29, 53 (2014). 
 4. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 5. It is possible for agreements to go beyond these basic provisions. See F. Joseph Warin 
& Peter E. Jaffe, Commentary, The Deferred-Prosecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest Proposal for 
Reform, 19 ANDREWS WHITE-COLLAR CRIM. REP., no. 12, Sept. 2005, at 4–5 (suggesting that 
“[o]ne of the most appealing aspects of [DPAs] is the ability to tailor each one according to the 
specific needs of the respective parties, with both sides bargaining for what they hold most dear”). 
 6. Paola C. Henry, Note, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crimes After the Yates 
Memo: Deferred Prosecution Agreements & Criminal Justice Reform, 6 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 153, 
157–58 (2016); Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice: Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the 
Context of Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 642–43 (2014). 
 7. Wallace D. Loh, Note, Pretrial Diversion from the Criminal Process, 83 YALE L.J. 827, 
827 (1974). 
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allegations of more serious misconduct by corporate entities and the 
individuals who run them has been far more recent, with the first agreement 
being signed in 1994.8 DPAs have enabled a largely administrative system of 
criminal justice to thrive in the corporate context9—a system that at times 
seems concerned more with achieving efficiency and certainty-of-outcome 
than with dispensing justice. Indeed, many nations reject U.S.-style corporate 
DPAs because the agreements fail to adhere to basic rule-of-law principles 
such as transparency of process, judicial oversight, public interest 
accountability, and separation-of-powers. 
In form and function, DPAs have close similarities to plea bargains: they 
are both alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms wherein the 
government offers the defendant an opportunity to negotiate an out-of-court 
resolution to the matter instead of going to trial.10 Judge Joseph Goodwin, in 
deciding to reject a plea agreement in United States v. Stevenson,11 states the 
following: 
The United States criminal justice system . . . was never intended to 
place all the power of accuser, judge, and jury into the hands of the 
                                                                                                                            
 8. In 1994, Mary Jo White, then the United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, entered into a DPA with Prudential Securities. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What 
Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1873 (2005). 
 9. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2142 (1998) (“Perhaps every criminal defendant could have a jury trial when jury 
trials were rougher and readier procedures, when most defendants did not have legal counsel, 
when the substantive law was simpler, and when defendants’ procedural rights were rudimentary. 
But as the procedural complexity of the formal due process model increases, it becomes natural 
for the law to seek more efficient solutions, and over time such solutions have evolved into a de 
facto administrative system.”). 
 10. In plea deals, the accused agrees to accept guilt (unless it’s an Alford plea) and 
conviction without a trial in exchange for a lesser charge or sentence from the government. 
Similarly, in a DPA, the accused agrees to accept a host of provisions negotiated with the 
government—including paying a fine, strengthening internal compliance measures, etc.—in 
exchange for the dismissal of all charges upon successful completion of those provisions. See 
Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The 
Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2003) (explaining 
that in Alford pleas, “defendants plead guilty while simultaneously protesting their innocence”); 
Ellen S. Podgor, Disruptive Innovation in Criminal Defense: Demanding Corporate Criminal 
Trials, 69 MERCER L. REV. 825, 832–33 (2018) (explaining that companies are quick to resolve 
cases through DPAs and non-prosecution agreements because “[p]aying a fine and resolving the 
matter brought against them offers, like most plea agreements, finality with a defined result”); 
Greenblum, supra, note 8 at 1869 (explaining that in plea bargaining, “[a] guilty plea results in a 
conviction and collateral consequences attach no differently than if the offender had been 
convicted in a trial”) (citation omitted). 
 11. United States v. Stevenson, No. 2:17-CR-00047, 2018 WL 1769371, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. 
Apr. 12, 2018). 
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government. Criminal justice in this country was meant to be a 
balanced system that regulates the investigation, formal accusation, 
adjudication of guilt and innocence, and punishment of crimes. All 
aspects of this system were carefully considered and debated by the 
Founders to ultimately be memorialized for their fundamental value 
in our Constitution.12 
Despite the court’s warning, that is precisely what occurs with DPAs: the 
government acts as accuser, judge, and jury.13 Yet there is a critical difference 
between DPAs and plea bargains: in plea agreements, the court is permitted 
to approve or reject the negotiated deal based on a meaningful review of its 
substantive terms.14 (As the court states in United States v. Miller, Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure “contemplates the rejection of a 
negotiated plea when the district court believes that the bargain is too lenient, 
or otherwise not in the public interest. This power of review protects against 
erosion of the judicial sentencing power.”)15 On the other hand, when DPAs 
are used, courts are not permitted to make that kind of assessment—i.e., 
courts are not permitted “to call balls and strikes”16 like neutral umpires, 
reviewing deal terms negotiated between the government and defendant to 
ensure fairness and reasonableness. Such independent oversight by a court is 
necessary not only to protect against ‘erosion of the judicial sentencing 
power,’ but also to protect the wider public interest—particularly in criminal 
matters.17 It is this lack of meaningful judicial review that led one federal 
district court judge to state during a DPA approval hearing, “I have absolutely 
no choice in this matter, no discretion whatsoever . . . . I’m obliged to 
swallow the pill, whether I like it or not.”18 Moreover, it is this lack of 
meaningful judicial review that other countries tend to reject as they work to 
                                                                                                                            
 12. Id. at *9; see also id. at *9 n.77 (“Four of the ten Amendments contained in the Bill of 
Rights regulate the investigation, accusation, trial, and punishment of criminal conduct. See U.S. 
Const. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.”). 
 13. See infra Part I.C. 
 14. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)–(5). 
 15. United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
 16. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., J., D.C. Cir.) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls 
and strikes and not to pitch or bat.”). See generally Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY 
L.J. 641 (2012). 
 17. See United States v. Orthofix, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 316, 325 (D. Mass. 2013) 
(suggesting considerations of public interest are “heightened” in the context of the criminal law). 
 18. Arraignment at 10, United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-cr-150 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 
2018), ECF No. 9. 
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develop and implement their own DPA programs—programs with increased 
judicial safeguards for the accused and general public alike.19 
This Article attempts to shed light on issues surrounding the ongoing 
rejection of U.S.-style corporate DPAs—rejection by foreign countries intent 
on developing their own DPA programs with comparatively greater judicial 
oversight, and also rejection by U.S. judges, academics, legislators, and other 
legal experts who question the constitutionality of DPAs (e.g., do they create 
a ‘dual system of justice’?), who question whether DPAs interfere with 
fundamental rule-of-law and separation-of-power principles (e.g., do they 
allow the government to encroach upon powers, such as sentencing powers, 
that should remain exclusively in the province of a court?), and who question 
the effectiveness of the agreements within the context of the general purposes 
of criminal law (e.g., are DPAs effective regarding the extent to which they 
deter corporate crime, appropriately punish criminal acts, protect the public, 
rehabilitate bad actors, and provide restitution to victims?). 
The conclusion reached after considering these and related questions is 
clear: The time has come for the United States Congress to reject the status 
quo by reforming the nation’s corporate DPA program. Congress must 
balance the scales of justice to ensure rule-of-law and separation-of-power 
principles in addressing allegations of corporate misconduct through deferred 
prosecution. Hopefully, any reform process will include investigating DPA 
programs being drafted and implemented by courts and legislative bodies in 
other countries 20 —programs that could serve as models for how U.S. 
corporate DPAs might be improved. 
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will discuss the following: 
advantages and disadvantages of using DPAs in addressing allegations of 
corporate misconduct; a district court’s role in the DPA approval process; 
warnings set forth by a variety of legal experts, all suggesting that corporate 
DPAs in their current form present serious rule-of-law shortcomings; and, 
                                                                                                                            
 19. Ben Morgan, Joint Head of Bribery and Corruption within U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office, 
stated in a recent speech:  
The entire [DPA] process is only effective if, after full scrutiny, it is approved 
by the court. This is a key and distinguishing feature of the UK DPA system. 
The judge is asked to give a declaration; first, that disposal of the matter by 
way of a DPA is in the interests of justice; and secondly that the terms are fair, 
reasonable and proportionate.  
Ben Morgan, Joint Head of Bribery and Corruption, Address at Seminar for General Counsel and 
Compliance Counsel from Corporates and Financial Institutions (Mar. 7, 2017). 
 20. See Sandra Day O’Connor, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Remarks at Southern 
Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003) (“I suspect that with time, we will rely 
increasingly on international and foreign law in resolving what now appear to be domestic 
issues.”).  
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finally, specific concerns judges have expressed regarding corporate DPAs, 
including several recent DPA cases illustrating those concerns. Part II 
analyzes DPA programs that are new (or in the process of being developed 
and implemented) in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, focusing 
on aspects of the programs that ensure effective transparency, judicial 
oversight, and public interest accountability. Part III argues it is time for the 
United States Congress to take action in reforming the current situation and 
analyzes two Congressional bills—the Accountability in Deferred 
Prosecution Act, as well as the Ending Too Big to Jail Act—to see what role 
such legislation, if passed, might play in bringing about reform. This Part also 
takes a broader look at lessons learned from analyzing newly devised 
corporate DPA programs within other countries, and how those lessons could 
best be factored into reform activities taking place in the United States. The 
Article concludes with a brief summary of how and why it is now time for 
the United States to take action in reforming its corporate DPA program. 
I. THE U.S. CORPORATE DPA PROGRAM 
A. Advantages and Disadvantages 
In the United States, DPAs have “become a mainstay of white collar 
criminal law enforcement.”21 Professor Julie O’Sullivan calls their increased 
use part of the “biggest change in corporate law enforcement policy in the 
last ten years.”22 Federal prosecutors have long-touted their strengths, with 
former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer suggesting that “in many 
ways, a DPA has the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative effect as a 
guilty plea.”23 Yet, while the U.S. government continues to use DPAs to 
address an ever-expanding variety of alleged corporate misconduct,24 
                                                                                                                            
 21. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address at the New York 
City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-
general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-bar-association. 
 22. O’Sullivan, supra note 3, at 77 (“The biggest change in corporate law enforcement 
policy in the last ten years has been the plunge in criminal convictions of large organizations, and 
the DOJ’s consistent use of [deferred prosecution] agreements to dispose of criminal 
wrongdoing.”). 
 23. Breuer, supra note 21.  
 24. DPAs have been used to address a full range of alleged corporate misconduct, including 
various types of fraud and trade offenses, as well as allegations of violations of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, the Controlled Substances Act, the False Claims Act, and the Food, Drug 
& Cosmetic Act. 2013 Mid-Year Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs), GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (July 9, 2013), 
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commentators have suggested the agreements have serious rule-of-law 
deficiencies. As Professor Jennifer Arlen puts it, “[T]he [U.S. Department of 
Justice] has effectively granted authority to individual prosecutors’ offices to 
use [DPAs] to create duties, interpret them, and enforce them, without either 
adequate constraint on their authority to create duties or effective oversight, 
internal or external.”25 
Professor Jimmy Gurulé is more succinct in his criticism, saying that U.S.-
style corporate DPAs can make a “mockery of the criminal justice system.”26 
Clearly, there is disagreement as to whether the good that can result from 
employing DPAs outweighs the bad, and a fair amount of writing has 
explored their advantages and disadvantages. Regarding advantages, the 
agreements can be a means to: speedy and efficient dispute resolution;27 the 
implementation of improved corporate compliance programs inside 
companies; 28  the imposition of monetary penalties for alleged corporate 
misconduct;29 fewer collateral consequences of traditional prosecution being 
suffered by innocent third parties (including a company’s employees, 
customers, and shareholders);30 and increased cooperation being provided by 
companies during government investigations.31 
Regarding disadvantages, the agreements can lead to: the government 
focusing on addressing institutional instead of individual misconduct; 32 
                                                                                                                            
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2013-Mid-Year-Update-Corporate-Deferred-
Prosecution-Agreements-and-Non-Prosecution-Agreements.aspx. 
 25. Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates Imposed 
Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 231 (2016). 
 26. Carrick Mollenkamp & Brett Wolf, HSBC Might Pay $1.8 Billion Money Laundering 
Fine, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hsbc-moneylaundering-
settlement/exclusive-hsbc-might-pay-1-8-billion-money-laundering-fine-sources-
idUSBRE8B500Z20121206. 
 27. See Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate 
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1458 (2007). 
 28. See Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 112 (2014). 
 29. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, 
BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 1, 11 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/
300/299781.pdf. 
 30. Id. at 37.  
 31. See David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and 
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2013). 
 32. See Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014) https://www.nybooks.com/
articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ (“[T]he failure to prosecute 
those responsible [for the Great Recession] must be judged one of the more egregious failures of 
the criminal justice system in many years.”). 
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excessive government bargaining power in the DPA negotiation process with 
target companies;33 the appearance that alleged wrongdoers can “essentially 
buy their way out of a conviction”; 34  the creation of company-specific 
internal reform measures by government attorneys who sometimes lack 
training and expertise in corporate governance;35 a decrease in public access 
to information and guidance regarding permissible legal conduct since DPAs 
resolve matters without public trials, published court decisions, or binding 
judicial precedent; 36  and possible decreases in public involvement, 
transparency of judicial process, and adherence to rule-of-law and separation-
of-power principles in addressing corporate misconduct.37 
B. The Court’s Role in Approving DPAs 
In the United States, two recent federal appellate court rulings—United 
States of America v. Fokker Services B.V. (“Fokker”)38 and United States of 
America v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC Bank”)39—have set the parameters 
for a federal district court’s role in approving and implementing corporate 
DPAs. In Fokker, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
held that a district court’s role in approving a DPA is limited to performing 
the following narrow and circumscribed function: “to assure that the DPA in 
fact is geared to enabling the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the 
law, and is not instead a pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial 
                                                                                                                            
 33. See Paulsen, supra note 27, at 1434. 
 34. Philip Urofsky, Hee Won Moon & Jennifer Rimm, How Should We Measure the 
Effectiveness of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? Don’t Break What Isn’t Broken—The 
Fallacies of Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1170 (2012). 
 35. Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking 
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 112 (2007); see 
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 936 (2007) (“Federal 
prosecutors have stepped far outside of their traditional role of obtaining convictions, and, in 
doing so, seek to reshape the governance of leading corporations, public entities, and ultimately 
entire industries.”); Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 64 BUS. LAW. 253, 260–61 
(2008) (discussing the use of DPAs to enact various governance reforms within companies). 
 36. Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 139 (2010); Matt A. Vega, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of 
Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 425, 443 (2009). 
 37. Arlen, supra note 25, at 227; Connor Bildfell, Justice Deferred? Why and How Canada 
Should Embrace Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Cases, 20 CAN. CRIM. 
L. REV. 161, 180 (2016). 
 38. 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 39. 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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Act’s time constraints.”40 Therefore, said Fokker, when reviewing a DPA for 
possible approval pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2), a federal district court 
must “confine[ ] its inquiry to examining whether the DPA served the purpose 
of allowing [the defendant] to demonstrate its good conduct.”41 In HSBC 
Bank, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reinforced 
the Fokker ruling, stating: “[A] district court’s role vis-à-vis a DPA is limited 
to arraigning the defendant, granting a speedy trial waiver if the DPA does 
not represent an improper attempt to circumvent the speedy trial clock, and 
adjudicating motions or disputes as they arise.”42 
The practical impact of Fokker and HSBC Bank is clear, certainly in the 
D.C. and Second Circuits, and probably well beyond: if a federal prosecutor 
offers a DPA to a corporate defendant, and that defendant accepts the deal, a 
district judge is not permitted to reject the deal due to disagreement with its 
substantive terms. In effect, the agreement must be approved without 
meaningful judicial review.43 Moreover, as other courts are confronted with 
similar legal issues in the future, Fokker and HSBC Bank will likely be highly 
influential in the disposition of those cases because “judicial interpretations 
of statutes, once rendered, enjoy heightened stare decisis effect, sometimes 
referred to as a ‘super-strong’ presumption of correctness.”44 This has already 
occurred in the Fourth Circuit, where a district court judge approved a DPA 
even though he thought there was a risk the DPA would “provide insufficient 
deterrence to companies which otherwise would permit fraud, or fail to 
                                                                                                                            
 40. Fokker, 818 F.3d at 744. The Speedy Trial Act—18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174—mandates 
that a defendant’s trial begin within seventy days after indictment, but excludes from that seventy-
day limit “[a]ny period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the 
Government pursuant to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for 
the purpose of allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(2) 
(2018). It is that exemption that enables the government to resolve cases using DPAs. 
 41. Fokker, 818 F.3d at 747. 
 42. HSBC Bank, 863 F.3d at 129. 
 43. See Mark. A. Rush et al., BNA Insights: Imbalance of Power: Federal Prosecutors’ 
Nearly Unilateral Discretion to Resolve Allegations of Corporate Misconduct After D.C. Circuit 
Panel Overrules District Court’s Rejection of Deferred Prosecution Agreement in U.S. v. Fokker, 
48 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1005 (2016), reprinted at K&L GATES: STAY INFORMED 
http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/e2083b66-ea77-458a-bd88-aced48a16ecc/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8426cc68-bb99-40a5-899eb89f064ad73b/spfokker_srlr_
516.pdf (“Relying upon the Separation of Powers doctrine, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously held, in no uncertain terms, that district court judges 
are not empowered to reject deferred prosecution agreements (“DPAs”) because they disagree 
with the prosecutors’ charging decisions or elements of the agreement.” (emphasis added)). 
 44. Anita S. Krishnakumar, Longstanding Agency Interpretations, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1823, 1828 (2015) (“[W]hen it comes to reexamining judicial interpretations of statutes, courts 
tend to be extremely deferential to established prior constructions.” (emphasis omitted)).  
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prevent fraud, by its senior officials in the future.”45 The judge said that 
although the issue before the court had not yet been addressed by the appellate 
court sitting directly above (i.e., the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit), the standard set by Fokker made it clear to the judge that he 
“must approve the DPA and grant the motion.”46 It appears the die has been 
cast, and it is this lack of meaningful judicial review during the DPA approval 
process, along with related rule-of-law deficiencies, that are the focus of the 
remainder of this Article. 
C. Red Flags 
Red flags relating to corporate DPAs have been spotted by highly trained 
legal experts across the board—in academia, Congress, the judiciary, and 
private practice. This includes Professor John Coffee’s warning regarding a 
prosecutor’s excessive control over the DPA process (“the deeper problem 
lies in the danger that power corrupts and that prosecutors are starting to 
possess something close to absolute power”);47 Professor Richard Epstein’s 
statement that DPA agreements can “turn[] the prosecutor into judge and 
jury, thus undermining our principles of separation of powers”; 48 
Congressman Bill Pascrell, Jr.’s similar warning that DPAs give prosecutors 
“unmitigated power to be the judge, the jury and the sentencer”;49 and Judge 
Rosemary Pooler’s comment (in her concurring opinion in HSBC Bank) that 
through DPAs, “the prosecution exercises the core judicial functions of 
adjudicating guilt and imposing sentence with no meaningful oversight from 
                                                                                                                            
 45. United States v. Transport Logistics Int’l, Inc., No. 18-CR-00011, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 
2018) (order granting motion for speedy trial). In the case, the defendant was to pay a criminal 
penalty that was less than ten percent of the amount contemplated by the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines. In addition, “the corporation did not self-report the violations, and there remain 
members of the Board of Directors who oversaw, or failed to oversee, the company during the 
time period of the fraud.” Id. 
 46. Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
 47. John C. Coffee Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT’L. L.J. (July 25, 
2005), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/0297df7d-4897-4eb7-a38a-902445b51634/
?context=1000516. 
 48. Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 
28, 2006, at A14; see Gordon Bourjaily, DPA DOA: How and Why Congress Should Bar the Use 
of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 52 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 543, 547 (2015) (“DPAs undermine the rule of law by facilitating a shadow system of 
adjudications away from any oversight.”). 
 49. Deferred Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement Agreements Be Without 
Guidelines?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (statement of Rep. William Pascrell, Jr.). 
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the courts.”50 Similar conclusions were conveyed by a Yale Law Journal note 
published in 1974 (concluding that “[p]retrial diversion encroaches on 
judicial sentencing authority”51), as well as by several attorneys from private 
practice, writing that “a DPA amounts in sum and substance to a guilty plea 
and a conviction; the corporate defendant must . . . [also] typically subject 
itself to government oversight for the length of the deferral period—in 
essence a probationary period.”52 It appears, then, that many of the actions 
performed by a prosecutor during the DPA process—actions that are the 
functional equivalents of adjudicating guilt, sentencing, and determining 
periods of probation—are duties and functions that would normally fall 
within the province of a court or jury. 
It seems ill-advised for the law to continue developing in a manner that 
permits an absence of meaningful judicial oversight in the context of 
corporate DPAs when such oversight protection has been a hallmark of 
traditional litigation and various alternative dispute resolution processes—
including plea bargains, settlement agreements, and consent decrees. In all 
those areas, judicial oversight plays an instrumental role in protecting public 
interest and ensuring a check on prosecutorial power. 
First, in traditional litigation, when a judge reaches the point of delivering 
the sentence (meaning after conviction and after he or she has considered 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and various factors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)),53 the judge might decide to issue a sentence more in line with a 
different charge—a much-needed check on prosecutorial power. 
Second, in reviewing plea agreements, judges may, pursuant to Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, accept or reject the agreements set 
before them.54  Even when a detailed and specific plea deal has been 
negotiated and agreed upon by prosecutor and defendant, the judge 
“should . . . reach an independent decision on whether to grant charge or 
                                                                                                                            
 50.  United States v. HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125, 143 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 51. Loh, supra note 7, at 843–44. 
 52. Rush et al., supra note 43. 
 53.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M). 
 54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3); see Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148–49 (2012) (“[A] 
defendant has no right to be offered a plea, nor a federal right that the judge accept it.” (citations 
omitted)); United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1439 (10th Cir. 1995) (“There can be little 
doubt that rejecting a plea agreement due to the court’s refusal to permit the parties to bind its 
sentencing discretion constitutes the exercise of sound judicial discretion.”); United States v. 
Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Rule 11 [of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure] . . . contemplates the rejection of a negotiated plea when the district court believes that 
the bargain is too lenient, or otherwise not in the public interest. This power of review protects 
against erosion of the judicial sentencing power.” (citation omitted)). 
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sentence concessions.” 55  Judge Joseph Goodwin, in United States v. 
Stevenson, 56  explains how he rejected proffered plea agreements in two 
previous cases after determining that neither plea was in the public interest.57 
Finally, with respect to settlement agreements and consent decrees, in 
reviewing agreements made in areas such as class actions, shareholder 
derivative suits, and certain kinds of bankruptcy matters, judges have 
historically had to ensure agreements were “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”58 
Even when consent decrees involve highly complex and technical areas like 
environmental cleanup issues under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), courts have 
historically had to ensure settlements were “reasonable, fair, and consistent 
with the purposes that CERCLA is intended to serve.”59 
The Fokker and HSBC Bank courts did not go in this same direction with 
respect to corporate DPAs—i.e., they did not rule that district courts, in 
considering approval of a DPA under the Speedy Trial Act, must carefully 
review the agreement terms to ensure they are “fair, adequate, and 
reasonable” (or some such language).60  The danger, of course, is that if 
agreement terms cannot be considered during a DPA’s approval process, a 
court might end up giving its “stamp of approval to either overly lenient 
prosecutorial action, or overly zealous prosecutorial conduct.”61 It appears 
this is what occurred in the Fokker matter62: The trial court, after carefully 
reviewing the agreement terms, rejected the proposed DPA for being “grossly 
disproportionate to the gravity” of the misconduct.63 After the appellate court 
                                                                                                                            
 55. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY 9 (3d ed. 
1999) (emphasis added), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
criminal_justice_standards/pleas_guilty.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 56. United States v. Stevenson, No. 2:17-cr-00047, 2018 WL 1769371, at *1 (S.D.W. Va. 
Apr. 12, 2018). 
 57. See United States v. Wilmore, 282 F. Supp. 3d 937 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 10, 2017); United 
States v. Walker, No. 2:17-cr-00010, 2017 WL 2766452 (S.D.W. Va. June 26, 2017). 
 58. United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 59. United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 253, at 19 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3042)). 
 60. In the Fokker case, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that a 
district court’s role in approving a DPA is limited to performing the following narrow and 
circumscribed function: “to assure that the DPA in fact is geared to enabling the defendant to 
demonstrate compliance with the law, and is not instead a pretext intended merely to evade the 
Speedy Trial Act’s time constraints.” 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Such a circumscribed 
role prevents a trial court from judicially reviewing DPA agreement terms for fairness and 
reasonableness. 
 61. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 166 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated 
and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 62. See infra “Fokker DPA,” Part I.D.2. 
 63. Fokker, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 167. 
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ruled that the trial court had “significantly overstepped its authority” in 
rejecting the DPA,64 the case was returned to the trial court, which then 
immediately approved the agreement. Clearly, this was a case in which a trial 
court provided its stamp of approval to what it thought was an overly lenient 
prosecutorial action.65 
D. Judges Rejecting U.S. Corporate DPAs 
The end of the previous section describes a case in which a trial court is 
essentially forced to approve a DPA that it thought was overly lenient. 
Moving forward, there will surely be similar cases: Trial courts approving 
DPAs in conformity with Fokker and HSBC Bank, yet giving that approval 
begrudgingly due to a belief that the agreements are overly lenient or overly 
zealous. Following are several examples of this situation playing out: DPAs 
that are approved by district courts in the face of clear reluctance to make 
such a ruling. 
1. U.S. Bancorp DPA 
On February 12, 2018, U.S. Bancorp (USB) entered into a DPA, including 
a $528 million penalty, with the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York.66 The criminal charges included two violations of the 
Bank Secrecy Act by USB’s subsidiary, U.S. Bank National Association (the 
“Bank”), for failures in filing suspicious activity reports, as well as failures 
in carrying out its anti-money laundering program. 67  The Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) examiner assigned to the Bank 
“repeatedly warned USB officials, including the [anti-money laundering 
officer], of the impropriety” occurring with respect to how the Bank’s 
monitoring programs were being managed; the examiner’s actions made it 
clear that senior level managers within the Bank were aware of ongoing 
problems with the monitoring programs.68 
                                                                                                                            
 64. Fokker, 818 F.3d at 747. 
 65. See Fokker, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (“The parties are, in essence, requesting the Court to 
lend its judicial imprimatur to their DPA.”). 
 66. Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan 
U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against U.S. Bancorp for Violations of the Bank 
Secrecy Act (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-
announces-criminal-charges-against-us-bancorp-violations-bank. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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In addition, from October 2011 through November 2013, the Bank 
neglected to timely report suspicious banking activities of a customer named 
Scott Tucker.69 The Bank had been put on notice that it was being used by 
Tucker to launder money from an illegal payday lending operation, and USB 
employees disregarded numerous indicators suggesting Tucker was using 
various Native American tribal companies to conceal his ownership of 
accounts at the Bank. For example, Tucker spent tens of millions of dollars 
from supposedly tribal-owned accounts on personal items and projects, 
including the purchase of a home in Aspen, Colorado, as well as the 
maintenance of a professional Ferrari racing team. 70  In addition, despite 
learning about a Federal Trade Commission lawsuit against the tribal 
companies and Tucker in April 2012, the Bank did not file a suspicious 
activity report regarding Tucker until it was served with a subpoena to do so 
in November 2013.71 Tucker was ultimately convicted in October 2017 of 
various offenses associated with his illegal payday lending operation; he was 
later sentenced to nearly seventeen years in prison.72 
At a hearing on February 22, 2018, the court reviewing the USB DPA said 
it was “troublesome” to see the government use a DPA to resolve a matter 
“in which a corporation . . . admits or, to all intents and purposes, admits the 
commission of felonies, [and] avoids criminal prosecution essentially by 
paying a fine.”73 The economic impact of that fine would, the court surmised, 
likely be borne by company shareholders “while individuals who may be 
criminally responsible pay nothing.”74 The court said it was “likely . . . that a 
consequence of the [DPA] is that individuals who committed the felonies on 
behalf of the bank . . . [will] walk away.”75 The court said that “both the 
interests of deterrence and the interests of just punishment are better served 
in all or most cases by prosecution of the individuals responsible” and that 
“[i]f you really want to deter, the way to do it is to make the individuals pay 
the price for the crimes.”76 Finally, apparently resigning himself to having to 
approve the DPA in conformity with Fokker and HSBC Bank, the court states 
                                                                                                                            
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Steve Vockrodt, Payday Lender Scott Tucker Gets 16 Years, 8 Months in Prison for $2 
Billion Ripoff Scheme, KAN. CITY STAR (Jan. 5, 2018), 
https://www.kansascity.com/news/business/article193241289.html. 
 73. Transcript of Arraignment at 8, United States v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 18-CR-150 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018), ECF No. 9. 
 74. Id. at 9. 
 75. Id. at 8. 
 76. Id. at 9. 
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at the conclusion of the hearing: “I understand from the precedence [sic] in 
the Second Circuit and in the D.C. Circuit, I have absolutely no choice in this 
matter, no discretion whatsoever . . . I’m obliged to swallow the pill, whether 
I like it or not.”77 
2. Fokker DPA 
Fokker Services B.V., a Dutch aerospace company, was charged with one 
count of conspiring to violate the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA) by exporting aircraft parts and technologies to customers in the 
U.S.-sanctioned countries of Iran, Burma, and Sudan.78 The activities took 
place between 2005 and 2010, during which time the company was “fully 
aware of the application of U.S. export laws, an issue which was repeatedly 
raised internally with the company’s management.” 79  Among the 1,153 
shipments of aircraft parts “were 99 transactions involving Fokker Services’ 
customer, Iran Air, which was the subject of a special order from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce prohibiting Fokker or any third party from 
exporting U.S.-origin commodities to Iran Air or providing services to Iran 
Air.” 80  The company’s gross revenue for the illegal shipments was 
approximately $21 million.81 In order to avoid detection, company employees 
engaged in a number of wrongful behaviors and practices, including (1) 
failing to provide tail numbers from airplanes to repair service shops located 
in the United States; (2) scrubbing references to the country of Iran in written 
materials provided to repair service shops and company subsidiaries located 
in the United States; and (3) telling company employees to hide documents 
of Iranian transactions when the company was audited by the U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA).82 
In addition, this conduct was known and approved by the company’s 
senior corporate managers, as well as Fokker’s legal and export compliance 
                                                                                                                            
 77. Id. at 10. 
 78. Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office, D.C., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fokker Services B.V. 
Agrees to Forfeit $10.5 Million for Illegal Transactions with Iranian, Sudanese, and Burmese 




 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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departments.83 The DPA resolving the matter, which included a $10.5 million 
forfeiture to settle claims by the U.S. Department of Justice and a $10.5 
million civil penalty to settle charges by the U.S. Commerce and U.S. 
Treasury Departments, appears to have been offered due to the company’s 
“remedial actions to date and its willingness to acknowledge responsibility 
for its actions.”84 The federal district court, which rejected the DPA and said 
it was “grossly disproportionate to the gravity” of the offending behavior,85 
concluded: “[I]t would undermine the public’s confidence in the 
administration of justice and promote disrespect for the law for it to see a 
defendant prosecuted so anemically for engaging in such egregious conduct 
for such a sustained period of time . . . .”86 The appellate court ruled that the 
district court had overstepped its authority in reviewing the terms of the deal, 
vacated the lower court ruling, and remanded the matter back to the district 
court.87 Immediately thereafter, the district court approved the DPA.  
3. General Motors DPA 
In a 2015 legal case in which at least 174 deaths were linked to an ignition-
switch defect at General Motors (GM), the matter was resolved through a 
DPA.88 The criminal charges included one count of concealing material facts 
from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and one 
count of wire fraud.89 Under the DPA, the company admitted to (1) failing to 
disclose, in a timely fashion, a safety defect to NHTSA, and (2) misleading 
consumers about the defect.90 The problem started a decade earlier when, in 
2004 and 2005, customers started experiencing “sudden stalls and engine 
shutoffs” caused by the defective switch.91 The company failed to address the 
                                                                                                                            
 83. Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office, D.C., supra note 78. 
 84. Id. 
 85. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 79 F. Supp. 3d 160, 167 (D.D.C. 2015), vacated 
and remanded, 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 86. Id. 
 87. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 88. Drew Harwell, Why General Motors’ $900 Million Fine for a Deadly Defect Is Just a 
Slap on the Wrist, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
business/wp/2015/09/17/why-general-motors-900-million-fine-for-a-deadly-defect-is-just-a-
slap-on-the-wrist/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.00682b5c54e1. 
 89. Press Release, U.S. Attorneys Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Manhattan 
U.S. Attorney Announces Criminal Charges Against General Motors and Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement with $900 Million Forfeiture (Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-announces-criminal-charges-against-general-motors-and-
deferred. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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issue, “even reject[ing] a simple improvement to the head of the key that 
would have significantly reduced unexpected shutoffs at a price of less than 
a dollar a car.”92 Instead of focusing on finding a fix, GM “gave assurance 
that the defect did not pose a safety concern.”93 By the spring of 2012, the 
company was aware the problem could result in the non-deployment of 
airbags in some of its vehicles.94 Yet the company waited until February 
2014—twenty months later—to notify NHTSA of the concern, thereby 
“egregiously disregard[ing] NHTSA’s five-day regulatory reporting 
requirement for safety defects.” 95  The DPA resolving the matter, which 
included a $900 million fine, appears to have been offered due to the 
company’s “exemplary actions” in accepting and acknowledging 
responsibility for its conduct.96  Although the case was resolved after the 
issuance of a highly touted memorandum by then-Deputy Attorney General 
Sally Yates encouraging that individuals be identified and considered for 
prosecution in matters of corporate misconduct,97 none of the GM employees 
have faced criminal charges 98 —a result that one federal judge calls “a 
                                                                                                                            
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Sally Quillian Yates to Assistant Attorneys 
Gen., Dirs. of the FBI and the Exec. Office for U.S. Trs., and U.S. Attorneys (Sept. 9, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download. The guidance, designed to strengthen DOJ’s 
ability to hold individuals accountable for corporate misconduct, revises the DOJ’s Principles of 
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations. Id. at 3; see also U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 
supra note 1, § 9.28.000. The Yates Memorandum sets forth the following six steps to achieve its 
goal: 
(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to 
the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for 
misconduct; (2) criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on 
individuals from the inception of the investigation; (3) criminal and civil 
attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in routine 
communication with one another; (4) absent extraordinary circumstances or 
approved departmental policy, the Department will not release culpable 
individuals from civil or criminal liability when resolving a matter with a 
corporation; (5) Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a 
corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should 
memorialize any declinations as to individuals in such cases; and (6) civil 
attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the company and 
evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on considerations 
beyond that individual’s ability to pay.  
Memorandum, Yates, supra, at 2–3. 
 98. Harwell, supra note 88. 
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shocking example of potentially culpable individuals not being criminally 
charged.”99 
4. TLI DPA 
On March 12, 2018, transportation company Transport Logistics 
International (TLI)—which provides services for transporting nuclear 
materials to customers in the United States and abroad—reached a DPA 
agreement with DOJ.100 The company was charged with conspiracy to violate 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 101  Although DOJ said the 
company had provided “substantial cooperation” during its investigation into 
the matter, and that the company had “terminat[ed] the employment of all 
employees engaged in the misconduct,”102 the district court reviewing the 
agreement pointed out that “there remain members of the Board of Directors 
who oversaw, or failed to oversee, the company during the time period of the 
fraud.”103 The court further noted that (1) the company did not self-report the 
violations, (2) a large percentage of company business consisted of the same 
kind of uranium transportation work that had been secured through fraudulent 
activities, and (3) that the DPA required a penalty of less than ten percent of 
the amount recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.104 Thus, said 
the court, “there is a risk that a DPA under these circumstances will provide 
insufficient deterrence to companies which otherwise would permit fraud, or 
                                                                                                                            
 99. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 41 (D.D.C. 2015). Subsequent 
news reports suggest it is very difficult to prove outright fraud by employees within the 
automobile industry. According to former federal prosecutor Matthew L. Schwartz, “[U]nlike 
other regulated industries where health or human safety is involved, there is no criminal statute 
aimed at the [ ]  carmakers that does not require specific criminal intent.” Danielle Ivory and Ben 
Protess, Laws Hinder Prosecutors in Charging G.M. Employees in Ignition Defect, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 19, 2015, at B1. 
 100. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2018 MID-YEAR UPDATE ON CORPORATE NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (NPAS) AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (DPAS) 5 
(2018) https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-mid-year-npa-dpa-
update.pdf.  
 101. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Transp. Logistics Int‘l Inc. Agrees to Pay $2 
Million Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Case (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/transport-logistics-international-inc-agrees-pay-2-million-
penalty-resolve-foreign-bribery. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Order Approving Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. Transp. 
Logistics Int’l, Inc., No. 8:18-cr-00011-TDC (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2018), 
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/digital_assets/30ddb5eb-54d5-406d-bb95-5df554d173ef/
TLI-DPA.pdf.  
 104. Id.  
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fail to prevent fraud, by its senior officials in the future.”105 It is interesting to 
read the back-and-forth conversation between the court and the government 
with respect to the issue of deterrence. In the following exchange that took 
place in a hearing regarding the DPA, it appears the court and the government 
have different notions about the fairness and effectiveness of U.S.-style 
DPAs: 
THE COURT: Well, the issue isn’t really that, is it? I mean, isn’t 
the issue whether the company can be -- you filed this Information. 
So you believe there is probable cause to believe that the institution 
is criminally liable, correct? 
[THE GOVERNMENT]: We believe -- yes, through the acts of the 
employees that have been charged. 
THE COURT: So you have a case. You have probable cause to 
believe a crime was committed. You have a potential defendant, and 
yet you’re deferring from prosecuting because there are certain 
people as part of the company who had nothing to do with it and 
because there is some collateral damage.  
Every criminal case we have there is collateral damage. There are 
family members who suffer greatly, and the Department doesn’t 
seem to worry about their fate when they charge a defendant. So 
why is this different? 
[THE GOVERNMENT]: Well, in this case, you know, the company 
also, once the conduct was brought to their attention, did the right 
things. So the company fully cooperated. The company remediated. 
Their cooperation was extensive and assisted us in making these 
prosecutions, and the Department wants to incent companies to 
continue to do those things, and we think those things are extremely 
important.  
So in addition to wanting the company -- we’re not in the business 
of trying to put companies out of business. There is also the 
cooperation and the remediation and the compliance enhancements 
that we do want to incent going forward. 
                                                                                                                            
 105. Id. At an earlier hearing on the DPA, the court stated,  
[T]he thing that always bothers me about deferred prosecution agreements is 
that it seems as if the discussion is always about what do we do to save the 
company when it’s the company and its personnel who were engaged in 
crimes. I mean, why is the goal always to save the company as opposed to 
render justice when there has been significant criminal activity? 
Transcript of Proceedings at 16–17, United States v. Transp. Logistics Int’l, Inc., No. 8:18-cr-
00011-TDC (D. Md. Mar. 12, 2018).  
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THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
[THE GOVERNMENT]: And if this was simply an effort to try to 
seek a death penalty for the company, then that may not incent 
future companies to do those things, to cooperate, to remediate, 
to -- 
THE COURT: Or it would incentivize them to police their own 
shops better than this one did. 
[THE GOVERNMENT]: Well, we’re hopeful that through both, 
you know, the [DPA] with the company but also through the 
charges against the individuals and the pleas with the individuals, 
that that will be a sufficient deterrent to other companies and other 
individuals when viewing conduct like this. 
THE COURT: How does a [DPA] provide any deterrence? 
[THE GOVERNMENT]: It has obligations for the company that it 
needs to continue to cooperate, that the company needs to report to 
the Government on an annual basis, that the company needs to meet 
the standards of the compliance that’s outlined in the Agreement, as 
well as that the company needs to pay the fine.  
And so there are a number of obligations of the company, and if the 
company doesn’t meet those things, doesn’t move forward as a 
good corporate citizen, then the company will -- the Agreement will 
be breached, and the company will be charged. We think that is a 
significant deterrence. 
THE COURT: What about general deterrence, though? 
[THE GOVERNMENT]: General deterrence? You know, I expect 
companies are not looking to be -- enter into [DPAs]. Companies 
do not want to have -- you know, be broadcast that they have 
engaged in misconduct, do not want to pay criminal penalties, do 
not want to have the -- have to report to the Government about their 
compliance, and do all of these steps that are required in the 
agreement. So that, coupled with the individual prosecutions, which 
are closely aligned here, I think is a sufficient deterrent to other 
individuals -- companies act through their individuals -- and other 
companies from engaging in this conduct going forward.106 
U.S. District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff—who did not preside over this 
TLI matter—has also homed in on the possibility that DPAs are ineffective 
with respect to deterrence. Judge Rakoff has argued that the current process 
of negotiating DPAs to address corporate misconduct “is not the best way to 
                                                                                                                            
 106. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 105, at 18–20. 
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proceed” and that “the future deterrent value of successfully prosecuting 
individuals far outweighs the prophylactic benefits of imposing internal 
compliance measures that are often little more than window-dressing.”107 In 
the TLI matter, the trial court, despite strongly expressed apprehension to 
doing so, ultimately concludes that it must approve the DPA based on the 
standard set forth in United States v. Fokker Services B.V.108 Specifically, said 
the court, it “may only fail to approve a DPA if it is not ‘geared to enabling 
the defendant to demonstrate compliance with the law’ and is instead ‘a 
pretext intended merely to evade the Speedy Trial Act’s time constraints.’”109 
E. Tip of the Iceberg? 
In three of the four DPAs discussed above, the federal judge involved in 
the review process expresses strong misgivings about approving the 
agreement (indeed, in the Fokker matter, the trial court outright rejected the 
DPA until the appellate court vacated that ruling and remanded the case back 
to the trial court). In the fourth case (involving the General Motors DPA), a 
court not involved with its approval nevertheless felt compelled to express 
shock and dismay that no individuals were criminally charged in the matter. 
Given that the U.S. government appears to sometimes engage in DPAs and 
non-prosecution agreements110 that are not made public,111 it is difficult to 
know how many more agreements might exist where the reviewing judge 
expresses opposition to approval, but ultimately yields to existing precedent, 
ruling in favor of the motion to approve. 
Two federal judges, writing in two separate judicial opinions, have asked 
Congress to bring clarity to this area of the law: Judge Emmet Sullivan calls 
for improved standards for courts (specifically writing that “congressional 
action to clarify the standards a court should apply when confronted with a 
                                                                                                                            
 107. Rakoff, supra note 32. 
 108. 818 F.3d 733, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2016).  
 109. Order Approving Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 103, at 3. 
 110. There is a difference between DPAs and NPAs: DPAs are filed in federal court, along 
with a charging document, and they are subject to court approval. See Memorandum from Craig 
S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of Dep’t Components & 
U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 1 n.2 (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/dag/legacy/2008/03/20/morford-useofmonitorsmemo-03072008.pdf [hereinafter 
Morford Memorandum]. NPAs, however, are merely letter agreements between DOJ and the 
target company. See id. With NPAs, a charge is not filed and the agreement is not reviewed by a 
court. See id. 
 111. See Eric Williamson, First Amendment Clinic Obtains 18 More of DOJ’s Secret Deals 
with Corporate Offenders, UNIV. VA. SCH. LAW: NEWS & MEDIA (June 4, 2015), 
https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2015_sum/foia.htm. 
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corporate deferred-prosecution agreement may be appropriate”),112 and Judge 
Rosemary Pooler calls for increased judicial oversight (specifically writing, 
“I respectfully suggest it is time for Congress to consider implementing 
legislation providing for [meaningful court oversight of DPAs].”113). In both 
regards—delineating standards for courts, and providing judicial oversight—
several countries outside the United States have crafted DPA programs that 
are superior to the U.S. program in terms of affording these and other rule-
of-law and separation-of-power protections. 
In criticizing DPAs, commentators have suggested that (1) in corporate 
cases, it appears that DOJ has been pursuing criminal actions against 
companies instead of the individuals who run those companies,114 and (2) that 
DOJ seems to be using DPAs regularly in addressing allegations against 
entities, but only rarely for allegations against individuals.115 As for the first 
criticism, Judge Jed S. Rakoff argues that the shift in recent decades to 
focusing on prosecuting companies rather than individuals has “often been 
rationalized as part of an attempt to transform ‘corporate cultures,’ so as to 
prevent future crimes”116—an approach the judge suggests has led to an 
increasing use of DPAs and “to some lax and dubious behavior on the part of 
prosecutors, with deleterious results.”117 Other commentators agree, stating, 
“In a post-Enron world, DOJ officials appear to believe that the principal role 
of corporate criminal enforcement is to reform corrupt corporate 
cultures . . . rather than to indict, to prosecute, and to punish.”118 
                                                                                                                            
 112. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 30 n.9 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 113. United States v. HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125, 143 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 114. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 13 (2014) [hereinafter GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL] (“In about two-thirds of the 
cases involving deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreements and public corporations, the 
company was punished but no employees were prosecuted.”). Professor Garrett also points out 
that when employees have been charged, most have not been “higher-up officers of the 
companies, but rather middle managers of one kind or another and also some quite low-level 
individuals.” Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 
1802 (2015); cf. Rakoff, supra note 32 (suggesting that, among the various parties to a DPA, “the 
happiest of all are the executives, or former executives, who actually committed the underlying 
misconduct, for they are left untouched.”). See generally James B. Stewart, In Corporate Crimes, 
Individual Accountability is Elusive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/02/20/business/in-corporate-crimes-individual-accountability-is-elusive.html (“The entire 
structure of a corporation is intended to protect and insulate high-ranking executives, who are 
often shielded from knowledge of wrongdoing, even if they have tacitly approved it.”). 
 115. See GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 114, at 263 (“Prosecutors rarely offer 
leniency to encourage individuals to rehabilitate.”). 
 116. Rakoff, supra note 32. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 161 (2008). 
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As for the second criticism, it applies to both DPAs and to “C” plea 
bargain agreements119—sometimes referred to as “take it or leave it” pleas120 
because the court can only accept or reject the charge and sentence deal 
negotiated by the prosecutor and defendant (as opposed to a “B” plea, which 
permits the court to accept the plea and impose a sentence at its discretion).121 
In considering a “C” plea agreement in United States v. Aegerion 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Judge William G. Young writes of the “shocking 
disparity between the treatment of corporations and individuals in our 
criminal justice system.”122 Judge Young said he was “ashamed [he] had not 
recognized this glaring inequity until this case”—specifically that 
a forbidden two-tier system pervades our courts. Corporations 
routinely get “C” pleas after closed door negotiations with the 
executive branch while individual offenders but rarely are afforded 
the advantages of a “C” plea. Instead, they plead guilty and face a 
truly independent judge. This is neither fair nor just; indeed, it 
mocks our protestations of ‘equal justice under law.’123 
The court blamed the process itself, which it said “unduly hobbles this 
Court’s sworn constitutional duty to ‘do equal right to the poor and to the 
rich.’”124 The court added further that using such pleas in the manner they are 
currently being used (1) “displaces the common law adversarial proceeding 
and thus directly affects the judicial role,”125 and (2) might violate the Equal 
Protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.126 It could 
be argued that U.S.-style DPAs have corresponding shortcomings: they are 
offered routinely to corporations but rarely to individuals; the deals are made 
during closed-door negotiations between DOJ and defendant (which displace 
adversarial proceedings and thus directly affect the judicial role); and, finally, 
given that courts are not permitted to reject a DPA based on disagreement 
with its terms, the process lacks even the small amount of judicial oversight 
that is accorded courts reviewing “C” plea agreements.127 In short, it could be 
                                                                                                                            
 119. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 120. Jeremy Sternberg and Christopher Iaquinto, The Future of Corporate Criminal Pleas 
Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), 28 CRIM. JUST. 12, 15 (2014). 
 121. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B). 
 122. United States v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 217, 224 (2017). 
 123. Id. at 224–25.  
 124.  Id. at 228 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2018)). 
 125.  Id. at 221.  
 126.  See id. at 228.  
 127.  See In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 231 F.R.D. 52, 58 (D. Mass. 2005), in which 
Judge Young was reviewing a proposed settlement in a nationwide consumer class action. 
(“Judicial review must be exacting and thorough. The task is demanding because the 
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argued that U.S. corporate DPAs present an even greater danger of 
contributing to the creation of a two-tier justice system than do the “C” plea 
agreements about which Judge Young so vociferously complains. 
Moreover, it should be noted that a two-tier justice system is created not 
only when companies are treated differently than individuals, as is suggested 
by Judge Young. Two-tier justice also occurs when (1) a large company is 
offered a DPA when a smaller company engaging in the same behavior is 
not; (2) when, in addressing the same kind of misconduct, employees of 
larger firms are treated differently than employees of smaller firms; or (3) 
when, in addressing the same kind of misconduct, wealthier criminals are 
treated differently than poorer criminals. Consider, for example, the case of 
G&A Check Cashing, a small company located in Los Angeles. The company 
and its officers were charged with laundering $8 million. In the end, guilty 
pleas were obtained from the company (which paid a $1 million fine) and 
from two senior officers (both of whom were incarcerated).128 Compare that 
with the treatment of HSBC, a large company that had allegedly laundered 
billions of dollars: the company was given a DPA, and senior officers were 
not charged.129 As one scholar puts it, “The dramatically different treatment 
of HSBC and G&A and their respective senior officers can hardly be squared 
with any meaningful concept of ‘equal justice under the law.’”130 
To get rid of the two-tier justice system, defendants must be treated the 
same: big companies and small companies must be treated the same, and 
individuals must be treated the same whether they work in big companies, 
small companies, or no company at all.131 Indeed, Judge Emmet Sullivan 
makes a strong case in United States v. Saena Tech Corporation that DOJ 
                                                                                                                            
adversariness of litigation is often lost after the agreement to settle. The settling parties frequently 
make a joint presentation of the benefits of the settlement without significant information about 
any drawbacks. If objectors do not emerge, there may be no lawyers or litigants criticizing the 
settlement or seeking to expose flaws or abuses.”). 
 128. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Los Angeles Check Cashing Store, Head Manager 
and Compliance Officer Sentenced for Violating Anti-Money Laundering Laws (Jan. 14, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/cac/Pressroom/2013/008.html.  
 129. Editorial, Too Big to Indict, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at A38. 
 130. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to 
Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 1375 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 131. How does one go about pursuing individuals at the top of large companies? Judge Jed 
Rakoff argues that prosecutors could pursue top officers of larger companies in the same manner 
they approach cases involving mobsters and drug kingpins: “You start at the bottom and, over 
many months or years, slowly work your way up. Specifically, you start by ‘flipping’ some lower- 
or mid-level participant . . . . With his help, and aided by the substantial prison penalties now 
available in white-collar cases you go up the ladder.” Rakoff, supra note 32. Judge Rakoff 
suggests that DOJ does not pursue individuals because it “would involve the kind of years-long 
investigations that [DOJ] no longer [has] the experience or the resources to pursue.” Id. 
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should consider using DPAs “in appropriate circumstances when an 
individual who might not be a banker or business owner nonetheless shows 
all of the hallmarks of significant rehabilitation potential.” 132  The judge 
argues that certain non-violent offenders deserve DPAs133 and that “refusing 
such individuals the chance to demonstrate their true character and avoid the 
catastrophic consequences of felony convictions is, in this Court’s view, 
greater than the harm the government seeks to avoid by providing 
corporations a path to avoid criminal convictions.”134 
F. The Downside to Out-of-Court Resolutions 
In 1986, Judge Harry T. Edwards wrote that “[a]n oft-forgotten virtue of 
adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and application of public 
values.”135 Professor Owen Fiss expresses a similar sentiment when he states 
in his influential article, Against Settlement, that adjudication ensures a 
process that “explicate[s] and give[s] force to the values embodied in 
authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those 
values and to bring reality into accord with them.”136 Using DPAs to address 
corporate crime replaces long-cherished values embodied in the Constitution 
with other values: low-cost, efficiency, and certainty. However, as Judge 
Edwards reminds us, “Inexpensive, expeditious, and informal adjudication is 
not always synonymous with fair and just adjudication.”137 
Of course, proponents of DPAs see more strengths than weaknesses in 
using the tool. Consider former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer’s 
statement that DPAs have “the same punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative 
effect as a guilty plea.”138 It is certainly a bold assertion—but is it accurate? 
One former federal prosecutor suggests it is not, saying, “Companies are 
happy to enter into these deferred prosecution agreements because it’s 
become so commonplace now. . . . They take a bath in the press for a finite 
                                                                                                                            
132. United States v. Saena Tech Corp., 140 F. Supp. 3d 11, 46 (D.D.C. 2015). 
 133. See id. (finding that “[d]rug conspiracy defendants are no less deserving of a second-
chance than bribery conspiracy defendants.”).  
 134. Id.  
 135.  Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or 
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 676 (1986). 
 136.  Owen Fiss, Commentary, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984). 
 137.  Edwards, supra note 135, at 679; see Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trial 
and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1272 (2005) (“The recent accelerated decline 
in the number of trials is . . . part of a much broader turn from law, a turn away from the definitive 
establishment of public accountability in adjudication.”). 
 138.  Breuer, supra note 21. 
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period of time. The stock markets don’t even seem to punish them.” 139 
Moreover, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied these 
issues and concluded that “DOJ cannot evaluate and demonstrate the extent 
to which DPAs . . . contribute to the department’s efforts to combat corporate 
crime because it has no measures to assess their effectiveness” and “therefore, 
it could be difficult for DOJ to justify its increasing use of these tools.”140 If 
DOJ has ‘no measures to assess’ the effectiveness of DPAs, how can it be 
asserted with any confidence that DPAs have the same effect as guilty pleas 
with respect to punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation? Given the 
prominent use of DPAs in the corporate law enforcement context, it would 
be useful to know more information about how effective (or ineffective) they 
are in achieving the general purposes of the criminal law—including 
deterring criminal behavior and punishing it when it occurs, protecting the 
public from criminal conduct, rehabilitating bad actors, and providing 
restitution for victims 141 —especially when compared with the more 
traditional tools of plea agreements and courtroom trials.142 
There should be additional research conducted to determine if some of the 
reasons DPAs were first employed, and continue to be used, in the corporate 
context can be empirically validated. For example, prosecutors have 
indicated that a major driving force in choosing DPAs over traditional 
litigation is the belief that indictment alone can lead to a company’s ruin.143 
Commentators are quick to point to the case of Arthur Andersen, LLP, as an 
“example of indictment sounding the death knell for a firm.”144 In that case, 
the firm was indicted in March 2002, and was convicted of obstruction of 
                                                                                                                            
 139.  Danielle Douglas, Royal Bank of Scotland to Pay $612 Million to Resolve Libor Case, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2013) (emphasis added), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/rbs-to-pay-612m-to-resolve-libor-case/2013/02/06/2c0cc42c-6fd3-11e2-aa58-
243de81040ba_story.html?utm_term=.50579a6279a2. 
140. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO 
BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD 
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf.  
 141. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 1, § 9-28.200(B). 
 142. See generally RENA STEINZOR, WHY NOT JAIL?: INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, 
CORPORATE MALFEASANCE, AND GOVERNMENT INACTION (2015). 
 143. See Alex B. Heller, Corporate Death Penalty: Prosecutorial Discretion and the 
Indictment of SAC Capital, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 763, 763–64 (2015) (“In Andersen’s case, 
the indictment alone was a corporate death sentence, even before adjudication. The Anderson case 
and the lessons learned in its aftermath have been regarded as a turning point in government 
decisions to charge corporate offenders, especially in the financial services industry.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 144. Matt Senko, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 19 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 165 (2009). 
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justice, a felony.145 By the time the conviction was reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in May 2005, the company had already lost its clients and laid 
off most of its workforce. 146  With that kind of devastating impact on a 
company and its workers, it is natural for prosecutors to draw lessons they 
will carry forward in their frameworks for prosecutorial decision-making; as 
one prosecutor stated in 2012, “[I]t’s my duty to consider whether individual 
employees with no responsibility for, or knowledge of, misconduct 
committed by others in the same company are going to lose their livelihood 
if we indict the corporation.”147 
Yet, in 2013, Gabriel Markoff published an article entitled Arthur 
Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: Corporate Criminal 
Convictions in the Twenty-First Century,148 which challenged the indictment-
leads-to-company-ruin theory for targeted entities. Using empirical research 
methods and relying on large quantities of data, Markoff determined that 
from 2001 to 2010, no publicly traded company failed due to a conviction.149 
Markoff thus concludes that “the risk of driving companies out of business 
through prosecutions has been radically exaggerated.” 150  More research 
needs to be conducted; it is important to learn whether or not these pivotal 
prosecutorial decisions regarding the use of corporate DPAs are being 
influenced by incorrect assumptions.151 
II. DPA PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES 
Several countries worldwide have begun the process of implementing 
DPAs to address corporate misconduct. Before focusing on three of these 
programs in greater depth (those of Australia, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom), this Part will begin with a brief summary of each country’s 
approach. The common denominator among the programs is the requirement 
                                                                                                                            
 145. See Heller, supra note 143, at 769. 
 146. See Senko, supra note 144, at 763–64.  
 147. Breuer, supra note 21. 
 148. Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death Penalty: 
Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 797 (2013). 
 149. Id. at 797–98.  
 150. Id. at 802. 
 151. Note that in the excerpt of the hearing transcript from the TLI DPA proceedings printed 
in Part I.D.4, supra, the government attempts to justify offering a DPA in the case because “we’re 
not in the business of trying to put companies out of business.” Again, is it correct to assume that 
a company will be ‘put out of business’ if it is prosecuted instead of offered a DPA? More research 
needs to be conducted in order to conclusively answer that question. See Transcript of 
Proceedings, supra note 105, at 18–20. 
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for meaningful judicial review of the terms of each agreement—a key rule-
of-law and separation-of-power feature that U.S. corporate DPAs so far lack. 
 
Australia 
On December 6, 2017, the government introduced the Crimes Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2017 into Parliament, which includes a DPA program.152 
The process of producing the bill included obtaining input from the general 
public. The Attorney-General’s Department, in consultation with various 
government agencies, produced a draft code of practice to provide guidance 
for the program. Integrated into that draft are stakeholder views received in 
the 2016 Deferred Prosecution Agreements Public Consultation as well as 
the 2017 Proposed Model for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement Scheme in 
Australia Public Consultation.153  Thus, significant amounts of public 
feedback will inform the drafting of the final code of practice, due to be 
published when the DPA program actually begins.154 
One commentator organization to the draft stated, “The benefit of having 
judicial oversight of the DPA process should not be underestimated. It would, 
in our view, improve the transparency of the process and assist to maintain 
public confidence in the use of DPAs.”155 While the bill does not mandate 
judicial oversight, it mandates something similar: DPAs must be approved by 
an “approving officer” who is a former judicial officer of a federal, State, or 
Territory court. In other words, a person who has the knowledge and 
experience necessary to perform the same duties as would a court.156 That 
officer will approve the DPA if he or she believes its terms are “in the 
interests of justice”157 and “are fair, reasonable and proportionate.”158 
 
Canada 
On March 27, 2018, following a public consultation process, Canada 
announced that it introduced amendments to its Integrity Regime that would 
create a new DPA program—which they call Remediation Agreements—to 
                                                                                                                            
 152. Austl. Gov’t, Deferred Prosecution Agreement Scheme Code of Practice, ATTORNEY-
GEN.’S DEP’T: CONSULTATIONS, REFORMS & REVS., https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/
Pages/Deferred-prosecution-agreement-scheme-code-of-practice.aspx. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id.  
 155. Clifford Chance, Comment to Improving Enforcement Options for Serious Corporate 
Crime: A Proposed Model for a Deferred Prosecution Agreement Scheme in Australia 5 (May 1, 
2017) https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Proposed-model-for-a-deferred-
prosecution-agreement-scheme-in-australia/Clifford-Chance-DPA-Submission.pdf. 
 156. Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2017 (Cth) sch 2 pt 3, § 17G cl 2 (Austl.). 
 157. Id. § 17D cl 4(a). 
 158. Id. § 17D cl 4(b). 
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“advance compliance measures, [and] hold eligible organizations 
accountable for misconduct, while protecting innocent parties such as 
employees and shareholders from the negative consequences of a criminal 
conviction of the organization.”159 The bill was passed by both houses of 
Parliament and received Royal Assent on June 21, 2018.160 The new law 
mandates court approval of the agreements, which will be granted if the court 
finds the agreement to be “in the public interest”161 and terms to be “fair, 
reasonable, and proportionate to the gravity of the offence.”162 
 
France 
On December 9, 2016, France enacted the Law on Transparency, Fight 
against Corruption and Modernization of Economic Life, referred to as 
“Sapin II” after Finance Minister Michel Sapin.163 The law includes the public 
interest judicial agreement (convention judiciaire d’intérêt public), a tool that 
closely resembles DPAs.164 Under Sapin II, the Public Prosecutor can offer a 
public interest judicial agreement to legal entities—but not to individuals—
accused of corruption, influence peddling, or of laundering the proceeds of 
tax fraud.165 The agreements must be presented at a public hearing, reviewed 
and approved (i.e., either validated or dismissed) by the Court of First 
Instance, and published on the French Anticorruption Agency’s website.166 
The public hearing to consider approval of the agreement may include 
presentations by both the victims of the misconduct, as well as representatives 
of the corporate entity accused of wrongdoing.167 
 
                                                                                                                            
 159. News Release, Pub. Servs. & Procurement Can., Canada to Enhance Its Toolkit to 
Address Corporate Wrongdoing (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-
procurement/news/2018/03/canada-to-enhance-its-toolkit-to-address-corporate-
wrongdoing.html. 
 160. See Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1, S.C. 2018, c 12 (Can.). 
161. Id. § 715.37(6)(b). 
 162. Id. § 715.37(6)(c).  
 163. See Loi 2016-1691 du 9 décembre 2016 relative à la transparence, à la lutte contre la 
corruption et à la modernisation de la vie économique [Law 2016-1691 of December 9, 2016 
relating to the Transparency, the Fight Against the Corruption and the Modernization of the 
Economic Life], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF 
FRANCE], Dec. 10, 2016, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/12/9/2016-1691/jo/texte.  
 164. Id. art. 22.  
165. Id. 
166. Id.  
167. Id. 
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Ireland 
In Ireland, the Law Reform Commission was established by the Law 
Reform Commission Act 1975 to continuously review the law and propose 
reform measures. In 2016, the Commission issued a report entitled 
“Regulatory Enforcement and Corporate Offences”168 to address a series of 
corporate misconduct enforcement issues, including the possible introduction 
of DPAs. The report noted that “[t]he US model, in which DPAs are subject 
to little or no judicial oversight, would be difficult to reconcile with [Ireland’s 
constitutional requirements] . . . . The UK’s statutory system, in which 
judicial oversight is an integral part of the process . . . would appear a 
preferable model.”169 One commentator came to a similar conclusion, arguing 
that judicial oversight of DPAs in Ireland should include “review of the terms 
of the DPA on grounds of fair procedures and for a declaration that the 
agreement is fair, just, and reasonable.”170 
Another commentator suggests that the implementation of DPAs can 
“produce[] a bizarre set of incentives whereby the State is paid not to 
prosecute crimes orchestrated by managers who are incentivised to spend 
shareholder’s [sic] money to enter DPAs and avoid liability.” 171  The 
commentator argues that the limited amount of judicial review provided by 
U.S. courts “has compounded this problem,” and, accordingly, that requiring 
judicial oversight would “bring[] a welcome transparency” to any DPA 
program implemented in Ireland.172 
Finally, the Law Society of Ireland—the “education, representative and 
regulatory body of the solicitors’ profession in Ireland”173—responds to the 
Law Reform Commission’s paper on corporate offences by stating, “The 
Society would be in favour of DPAs along the lines of the UK model rather 
than the US model. Judicial and executive oversight is crucial.” 174  The 
                                                                                                                            
 168. LAW REFORM COMM’N, ISSUES PAPER: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND CORPORATE 
OFFENCES (2016) (Ir.). 
169. Id. at 38.   
 170. Daniel McCarron, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A Practical Proposal, 6 KING’S 
INNS STUDENT L. REV. 54, 61 (2016). 
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 173.  The Law Society engages in various statutory functions regarding the education, 
discipline, and regulation of the solicitors’ profession. L. SOC’Y IR., https://www.lawsociety.ie 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2018).  
 174. LAW SOCIETY SUBMISSION: RESPONSE TO LAW REFORM COMMISSION’S ISSUES PAPER 
ON: REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT AND CORPORATE OFFENCES 7 (2016) (Ir.), 
https://www.lawsociety.ie/globalassets/documents/committees/business/subs/response-lrc-
regulatoryenforcement-july2016.pdf. 
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Society noted that while it is important to help preserve corporate entities and 
the employment they provide, “this priority must not operate to damage 
public confidence in our authorities.”175 
 
Singapore 
On March 19, 2018, Singapore’s Parliament passed the Criminal Justice 
Reform Act, which includes DPAs. 176  The DPAs will be used only for 
corporate bodies (as opposed to individuals).177 They will be approved only 
if a court finds the agreements to be “in the interests of justice” and the DPA 
terms to be “fair, reasonable and proportionate.”178 
 
United Kingdom 
In 2013, following a public consultation process, the British Parliament 
passed the Crime and Courts Act, thereby creating a corporate DPA program 
within the U.K.179 The agreements can be applied to organizations but not to 
individuals.180  There is both a preliminary and final hearing process to 
approve a DPA, and in both processes the prosecutor must apply to the Crown 
Court for a declaration that the agreement “is likely to be in the interests of 
justice” and that the proposed terms of the agreement “are fair, reasonable 
and proportionate.”181 
 
Details of Australia, Canada, and UK Programs 
The United Kingdom introduced its DPA program in 2014, one year after 
its enabling legislation was passed.182 Australia and Canada have both made 
significant strides toward creating their own programs, but neither program 
has yet been completed. Since the three jurisdictions have been diligently 
creating and/or implementing new DPA programs, the sections that follow 
include a more in-depth look at legal and policy decisions being made in each 
jurisdiction, specifically around the following four questions: (1) what role 
will be played by the courts in the jurisdiction’s DPA program?, (2) what 
specific factors will be taken into consideration in determining whether a 
                                                                                                                            
 175. Id. 
 176. Criminal Justice Reform Act (Bill No. 14/2018) § 35 (Sing.) (amending Chapter 68 of 
the Criminal Procedure Code). 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id.  
 179. See Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, sch. 17 (UK).  
 180. See Deferred Prosecution Agreements, SERIOUS FRAUD OFF., 
https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidance-policy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecution-
agreements (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).  
 181. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, §§ 7(1), 8(1), sch. 17. 
 182. See id.  
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DPA will be offered in a particular matter?, (3) what terms of agreement will 
be offered to a defendant through a DPA?—i.e., will there be rules or 
guidelines put into place to ensure consistency-of-deal-terms among 
agreements?, and (4) to what extent will it be mandated that a given 
jurisdiction’s DPAs be made available to the public through publication? 
A. Judicial Oversight: Role Played by the Courts 
Australia 
In Australia, a DPA is approved by an “approving officer” rather a court. 
The Minister can appoint a person as an approving officer so long as the 
candidate “is a former judicial officer of a federal court or a court of a State 
or Territory” and “the person has the knowledge or experience necessary” to 
perform the job.183 
The Director of Public Prosecutions (Director) can enter a DPA agreement 
if he or she is satisfied that entering the DPA “is in the public interest.”184 
After the Director negotiates a DPA with the alleged wrongdoer,185  the 
agreement is given to the reviewing officer who must approve the agreement 
if he or she believes its terms are “in the interests of justice”186 and “are fair, 
reasonable and proportionate.”187 
If the Director and the accused both agree that the DPA should be revised, 
the Director must submit the revised document to an approving officer,188 
who will approve only if he or she believes the terms of the new agreement 
are “in the interests of justice” 189  and “are fair, reasonable and 
proportionate.”190 
The Director also determines whether or not there has been a material 
breach of the DPA. Although a finding of breach can lead immediately to the 
DPA ceasing to be in force,191 a court can overturn that determination, thereby 
putting the DPA back into force.192 
 
                                                                                                                            
 183. Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2017 (Cth) sch 2 pt 3, s 17G cl 2 (Austl.).  
 184. Id. s 17D cl. 2. 
 185. Id. s 17D cl. 1.  
 186. Id. s 17D cl. 4(a).  
 187. Id. s 17D cl. 4(b).  
 188. Id. s 17F cl. 1.  
 189. Id. s 17F cl. 3(a). 
 190. Id. s 17F cl. 3(b).  
 191. Id. s 17E cl. 1. 
 192. Id. s 17E cl. 2. 
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Canada 
In Canada, after the prosecutor and corporate entity have negotiated a 
DPA (called a “remediation agreement” in Canada), it will not come into 
force until it is approved by the court.193 In deciding whether to approve the 
agreement, the court must consider the following: (1) the reparations or 
restitution the organization is being required to make to victims (or the 
reasonableness of the prosecutor’s statement explaining why such reparations 
are not appropriate);194 (2) the explanation set forth by the prosecutor if he or 
she decided not to inform victims that remediation agreement negotiations 
had begun or that deal terms had been agreed upon;195 and (3) all victim and 
community impact statements presented to the court.196 
The court must approve the remediation agreement if it is satisfied the 
agreement is “in the public interest”197 and that its terms are “fair, reasonable 
and proportionate to the gravity of the offence.”198 Likewise, the court must 
approve a prosecutor’s request to modify an existing agreement so long as the 
court is satisfied the new agreement meets the same standard: it remains in 
the public interest and the terms are fair, reasonable and proportionate.199 The 
court must approve a prosecutor’s request to terminate an existing agreement 
if the court is satisfied that the entity has breached a provision of the 
agreement.200 If the agreement is terminated, the prosecutor can immediately 
move forward with prosecuting the alleged misconduct.201 
Finally, again upon application by the prosecutor, the court must “declare 
that the terms of the agreement were met if it is satisfied that the organization 
has complied with the agreement.”202 If that occurs, “the proceedings are 
deemed never to have been commenced and no other proceedings may be 
initiated against the organization for the same offence.”203 In other words, the 
entity can move forward with confidence that the matter has been completely 
resolved. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 193. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1, § 715.37(2), S.C. 2018, c 12 (Can.). 
 194. Id. § 715.37(3)(a). 
 195. Id. § 715.37(3)(b). 
 196. Id. § 715.37(3)(c). 
 197. Id. § 715.37(6)(b). 
 198. Id. § 715.37(6)(c). 
 199. Id. § 715.38. 
 200. Id. § 715.39(1). 
 201. Id. § 715.39(2). 
 202. Id. § 715.4(1). 
 203. Id. § 715.4(2). 
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United Kingdom 
Preliminary hearing for DPA approval 
In the U.K., after the DPA negotiations between the prosecutor and 
organization begin, but before its terms are agreed upon, the prosecutor must 
apply to the Crown Court for a declaration that the agreement “is likely to be 
in the interests of justice” and that the proposed terms of the agreement “are 
fair, reasonable and proportionate.”204 The Court must provide reasons for 
deciding whether or not to make that declaration.205 If the Court decides 
against making a declaration, the prosecutor is permitted to apply again to 
the Court after the agreement draft has been revised.206  Importantly, the 
hearing at which the prosecutor applies for the declaration must be held in 
private, and the Court’s decision in the matter (including relaying the Court’s 
reasons) must all be conducted in private.207 
Final hearing for DPA approval 
If the draft of the DPA has obtained the necessary approval through the 
preliminary hearing process, the prosecutor and the accused organization can 
then agree upon a final draft of the DPA. At that time, the prosecutor must 
seek approval through a final hearing process. The process is similar to the 
preliminary hearing process in that the prosecutor must apply to the Crown 
Court for a declaration that the final agreement “is likely to be in the interests 
of justice” and that the proposed terms of the agreement “are fair, reasonable 
and proportionate.”208 Again, the Court must provide reasons for deciding 
whether or not to make that declaration.209 However, at this final hearing 
stage, the hearing can be held in private or in open court.210 If the Court 
decides to make a declaration and thereby give final approval to the DPA and 
make the document come into force,211 the Court must do so, including giving 
its reasons, in open court.212 
Oversight for DPA breach and revisions 
In the U.K., the court is also involved in an oversight capacity when there 
is a possible breach of the DPA, and when the DPA needs to be revised. As 
for breach of the agreement, if the prosecutor concludes the organization has 
failed to comply with the DPA, he or she can apply to the Crown Court for a 
                                                                                                                            
 204. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 7(1), sch. 17 (UK). 
 205. Id. § 7(2), sch. 17. 
 206. Id. § 7(3), sch. 17. 
 207. Id. § 7(4), sch. 17. 
 208. Id. § 8(1), sch. 17. 
 209. Id. § 8(4), sch. 17. 
 210. See id. § 8(5), sch. 17. 
 211. Id. § 8(3), sch. 17. 
 212. Id. § 8(6), sch. 17. 
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review of that determination.213  If the court decides “on the balance of 
probabilities” that the organization has indeed failed to comply with the 
agreement, the court can either terminate the DPA or invite the two parties 
(the prosecutor and the entity) to remedy the failure.214 All these decisions by 
the court—i.e., the decision of whether or not there has been a DPA breach; 
whether or not the agreement will be terminated due to said breach; and 
whether or not the court decides to invite the two parties to work on 
remedying the failure—will be published by the prosecutor, along with the 
reasons the court gives for arriving at each decision.215 
As for revisions to the agreement, at any time while a DPA is in force, the 
two parties (the prosecutor and the entity) may agree to vary the DPA if 
revision is necessary to avoid a failure by the entity to comply with the 
agreement’s terms.216 The prosecutor must then apply to the Crown Court for 
a declaration that the revision “is in the interests of justice” and that the new 
terms “are fair, reasonable and proportionate.”217 Although the hearing for 
this application process can be held in private,218  if the court decides to 
approve the request and make the declaration, it must do so in open court, 
including providing its reasoning for the decision.219 The prosecutor must 
then publish both the text of the revised DPA, as well as the court’s approval 
decision and reasoning therefore.220 If the court decides not to approve the 
revised DPA, the prosecutor must publish the court’s decision and the 
reasoning behind that as well.221 
B. Public Interest Part I: Will a DPA Be Offered? 
Australia 
In Australia, guidance on when a prosecutor is likely to offer a DPA is 
provided in the Prosecution Policy of the Commonwealth.222 This will be 
                                                                                                                            
 213. Id. § 9(1)–(2), sch. 17. 
 214. Id. § 9(2)–(3), sch. 17. 
 215. Id. § 9(4)–(7), sch. 17. 
 216. Id. § 10(1), sch. 17. 
 217. Id. § 10(2), sch. 17. 
 218. Id. § 10(5), sch. 17. 
 219. Id. § 10(6), sch. 17. 
 220. Id. § 10(8), sch. 17. 
 221. Id. § 10(7), sch. 17. 
 222. COMMONWEALTH DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, PROSECUTION POLICY OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH: GUIDELINES FOR THE MAKING OF DECISIONS IN THE PROSECUTION PROCESS 
(2016), https://www.cdpp.gov.au/sites/g/files/net2061/f/Prosecution-Policy-of-the-
Commonwealth_0.pdf.  
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supplemented with information from other public documents.223 Factors that 
will be considered include: (1) the company’s role in the wrongdoing; (2) 
whether the company self-reported the misconduct; (3) the extent to which 
the company has cooperated with any investigations (including providing 
information about both corporate and individual misconduct); and (4) the 
company’s past conduct.224 
 
Canada 
In Canada, the prosecutor may enter into negotiations for a remediation 
agreement if the following five conditions are met: (1) the prosecutor believes 
there is a “reasonable prospect of conviction” with respect to the alleged 
offense;225 (2) the prosecutor believes the alleged offense was “not likely” to 
cause “serious bodily harm or death, or injury to national defence or national 
security”; 226  (3) the prosecutor believes the alleged offense “was not 
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a 
criminal organization or terrorist group;”227 (4) the prosecutor believes the 
agreement is “in the public interest” and is “appropriate” for the situation;228 
and (5) the Attorney General has also consented to negotiating an 
agreement.229 
In determining whether an agreement is appropriate and in the public 
interest, the prosecutor must consider the following nine factors: (1) the 
circumstance under which the alleged wrongdoing was brought to the 
attention of the government;230 (2) the “nature and gravity” of the alleged 
offense and “its impact on any victim”;231 (3) the degree to which senior 
officers of the accused organization were involved in the alleged 
wrongdoing;232 (4) “whether the organization has taken disciplinary action” 
against any employees involved in the alleged wrongdoing;233 (5) whether the 
                                                                                                                            
 223. AUSTL. ATTORNEY-GEN.’S DEP’T, IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS FOR SERIOUS 
CORPORATE CRIME: A PROPOSED MODEL FOR A DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENT SCHEME IN 
AUSTRALIA 7 (2017), https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Deferred-prosecution-
agreement-scheme/A-proposed-model-for-a-deferred-prosecution-agreement-scheme-in-
australia.pdf.  
 224. Id. 
 225. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1, § 715.32(1)(a), S.C. 2018, c 12 (Can.). 
 226. Id. § 715.32(1)(b). 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. § 715.32(1)(c). 
 229. Id. § 715.32(1)(d). 
 230. Id. § 715.32(2)(a). 
 231. Id. § 715.32(2)(b). 
 232. Id. § 715.32(2)(c). 
 233. Id. § 715.32(2)(d). 
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organization has done anything (such as making reparations) to remedy the 
harm caused, and to prevent similar transgressions; 234  (6) “whether the 
organization has identified or expressed a willingness to identify any person 
in the wrongdoing”;235 (7) whether the organization or its representatives 
have been convicted of (or sanctioned for) similar misconduct in Canada or 
elsewhere, or have entered any kind of agreement or settlement in Canada or 
elsewhere that pertains to similar misconduct;236 (8) whether the organization 
is alleged to have committed any other offenses (including those not eligible 




When deciding whether to enter a DPA, the prosecutor will be guided by 
existing codes of practice, including the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the 
Joint Prosecution Guidance on Corporate Prosecutions (“the Corporate 
Prosecution Guidance”), the Bribery Act 2010: Joint Prosecution Guidance 
(“the Bribery Act Guidance”), and the DPA Code.239 A key decision for the 
prosecutor is determining “whether or not a prosecution is in the public 
interest.”240 The more serious the offense, the more likely public interest will 
require a prosecution.241 Indicators of public interest include the value of the 
gain or loss, as well as “the risk of harm to the public, to unidentified victims, 
shareholders, employees and creditors and to the stability and integrity of 
financial markets and international trade.”242 The impact of the misconduct 
upon both the U.K. and other countries will also be considered. 243  The 
decision requires a simple balancing test, and a prosecution “will usually take 
place unless there are public interest factors against prosecution which 
outweigh those tending in favour of prosecution.” 244  The individual 
prosecutor involved in the matter is given complete discretion in determining 
                                                                                                                            
 234. Id. § 715.32(2)(e). 
 235. Id. § 715.32(2)(f). 
 236. Id. § 715.32(2)(g). 
 237. Id. § 715.32(2)(h). 
 238. Id. § 715.32(2)(i). 
 239. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, sch. 17, Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of 
Practice ¶ 2.3 (UK). 
 240. Id. ¶ 2.4. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. ¶ 2.4. 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. ¶ 2.5. 
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which factors are relevant, and the amount of weight that will be given to 
each factor.245 
Public interest factors weighing in favor of prosecution include the 
following: (1) the organization has a history of engaging in similar 
misconduct;246 (2) the alleged wrongdoing is part of the established business 
practices of the accused organization; 247  (3) the organization had an 
ineffective corporate compliance program (or no program in place at all);248 
(4) the organization failed to adequately respond to previous warnings, 
sanctions, or criminal charges for misconduct;249 (5) the organization failed 
to report “within reasonable time” wrongdoing that had been discovered 
internally; 250  (6) there was a “significant level of harm” to the victims 
resulting from the wrongdoing, or “a substantial adverse impact to the 
integrity or confidence of markets, local or national governments.”251 
Public interest factors weighing against prosecution include the following: 
(1) the entity cooperates with the government, including reporting 
misconduct otherwise unknown to the government, compensating victims, 
identifying relevant witnesses and making them available to the government 
for interviews, and sharing internal investigation reports; 252  (2) the 
organization has no history of engaging in similar misconduct;253 (3) there 
exists a “proactive” corporate compliance program within the organization;254 
(4) the misconduct “represents isolated actions by individuals, for example 
by a rogue director;” 255  (5) the misconduct “is not recent” and the 
                                                                                                                            
 245. Id. ¶ 2.6. 
 246. Id. ¶ 2.8.1(i). 
 247. Id. ¶ 2.8.1(ii). 
 248. Id. ¶ 2.8.1(iii). 
 249. Id. ¶ 2.8.1(iv). 
 250. Id. ¶ 2.8.1(v). 
 251. Id. ¶ 2.8.1(vii). 
 252. Id. ¶ 2.8.2. Note that the prosecutor will consider how early the entity self-reports, as 
well as the extent to which the organization “involves the prosecutor in the early stages of an 
investigation.” Id. ¶ 2.9.2. Furthermore, 
the prosecutor will critically assess the manner of any internal investigation to 
determine whether its conduct could have led to material being destroyed or 
the gathering of first accounts from suspects being delayed to the extent that 
the opportunity for fabrication has been afforded. Internal investigations which 
lead to such adverse consequences may militate against the use of DPAs. 
Id. ¶ 2.9.3. 
 253. Id. ¶ 2.8.2(ii). 
 254. Id. ¶ 2.8.2(iii). 
 255. Id. ¶ 2.8.2(iv). 
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organization is now “effectively a different entity” from the one in which the 
wrongdoing took place— 
for example [the entity] has been taken over by another 
organisation, it no longer operates in the relevant industry or 
market, [the entity’s] management team has completely changed, 
disciplinary action has been taken against all of the culpable 
individuals, including dismissal where appropriate, or corporate 
structures or processes have been changed . . .;256 
 (6) “[a] conviction is likely to have disproportionate consequences” for 
the entity under domestic law or the laws of other jurisdictions;257 (7) “[a] 
conviction is likely to have collateral effects on the public,” or upon the 
organization’s employees or shareholders;258 and (8) the entity self-reports in 
the early stages of finding a problem, and perhaps even gets the prosecutor 
involved during those opening stages—something that can assist the 
prosecutor in starting his or her own criminal investigation, as well as ensure 
that important materials are not destroyed and that suspects are not afforded 
a delay that could increase the opportunity for fabrication.259 
C. Public Interest Part II: DPA Agreement Terms 
Australia 
In Australia, a DPA must contain the following: (1) a statement of facts 
regarding the offenses involved;260  (2) the date on which the DPA will 
expire;261 (3) the various terms of the agreement;262 (4) the amount of the fine 
or penalty that will be paid by the defendant;263 (5) the circumstances or 
                                                                                                                            
 256. Id. ¶ 2.8.2(v). 
 257. Id. ¶ 2.8.2(vi). 
 258. Id. ¶ 2.8.2(vii). 
 259. Id. ¶¶ 2.9.2–.9.3. 
 260. Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (Cth) sch 2 pt 
3 item 17C(1)(a) (Austl.). 
 261. Id. item 17C(1)(b). 
 262. Id. item 17C(1)(c). 
 263. Id. item 17C(1)(d). The penalty “must be of a severity that the Director considers 
appropriate” after considering (1) the organization’s cooperation during DPA negotiations; (2) 
“the severity of the penalty that may be imposed by a court if the [entity] was convicted of [the 
offenses] specified in the DPA”; (3) whether the organization would also be putting money toward 
compensating victims, donating money to a charity or other third party; and (4) to what extent the 
organization forfeited various benefits derived from the wrongdoing. See id. item 17C(2)–(3). In 
the end, the Director can decide not to include a financial penalty “if the Director is satisfied that 
there are exceptional circumstances and it is not in the interests of justice to include such a 
penalty.” Id. item 17C(4). 
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actions that constitute a material breach of the DPA;264 and (6) an indication 
that if “the Director is satisfied that there has been a material”265 breach of the 
DPA provisions, the organization consents to having the Director move 
immediately forward with prosecution.266 
Although DPAs in Australia must contain the six provisions listed above, 
the agreements may contain any of the following as well: (1) a provision 
requiring the organization to compensate victims;267 (2) a provision requiring 
the organization to donate money to a charity or to a different third party;268 
(3) a provision requiring an organization to forfeit all benefits from the 
alleged misconduct;269 (4) a provision requiring an organization to address 
shortcomings in policies, procedures, and training programs within the 
organization that may have allowed misconduct to occur in the first place;270 
(5) a provision requiring an organization “to cooperate in any investigation 
or prosecution relating to a matter specified in the DPA;”271 (6) a provision 
requiring an organization “to pay reasonable costs incurred by a 
Commonwealth entity relating to negotiations for the DPA;” 272  (7) a 
provision stating the consequences that will occur if an organization fails to 




In Canada, a remediation agreement must include the following: (1) a 
statement of facts related to the alleged wrongdoing, as well as an agreement 
by the accused not to make public statements contradicting those facts;275 (2) 
an “admission of responsibility” by the accused;276 (3) an indication that the 
accused organization will, after the agreement has been entered, make 
“reasonable efforts” toward identifying individuals involved in the 
wrongdoing;277 (4) an indication that the accused organization will “cooperate 
                                                                                                                            
 264. Id. item 17C(1)(e).  
 265. Id. item 17A(3)(b).  
 266. Id. item 17C(1)(f).  
 267. Id. item 17C(2)(a)(i).  
 268. Id. item 17C(2)(a)(ii).  
 269. Id. item 17C(2)(a)(iii).  
 270. Id. item 17C(2)(a)(iv).  
 271. Id. item 17C(2)(a)(v).  
 272. Id. item 17C(2)(a)(vi).  
 273. Id. item 17C(2)(b).  
 274. Id. item 17C(2)(c).  
 275. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1, § 715.34(1)(a), S.C. 2018, c 12 (Can.).   
 276. Id. § 715.34(1)(b).  
 277. Id. § 715.34(1)(c).  
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in any investigation, prosecution or other proceeding” pertaining to the 
wrongdoing, “including by providing information or testimony;”278 (5) an 
obligation for the organization to forfeit “any property, benefit or advantage” 
resulting from the alleged misconduct; 279  (6) an indication that the 
organization will pay a penalty for the wrongdoing, including the amount to 
be paid;280 (7) an indication of the reparations and restitution required to be 
made to victims of the misconduct (or a statement by the prosecutor listing 
reasons why such reparations are inappropriate);281 (8) an indication that the 
organization will pay a “victim surcharge” amounting to thirty percent of the 
penalty already determined pursuant to paragraph 715.34(1)(f) of the Bill, “or 
any other percentage that the prosecutor deems appropriate”; 282  (9) an 
indication that the organization will report to the prosecutor on the 
agreement’s implementation process, including details of how such reporting 
will occur;283 (10) an indication of how “information obtained as a result of 
the agreement” can be utilized; 284  (11) a warning that a breach of the 
agreement “may lead to an application by the prosecutor for termination of 
the agreement and a recommencement of proceedings”;285 (12) an indication 
that the organization cannot deduct for income tax purposes any costs 
associated with fulfilling the terms of the agreement, including reparations 
costs;286 (13) an indication of the prosecutor’s right to revise or terminate the 
agreement, subject to court approval;287  and (14) “an indication of the 
deadline by which the organization must meet the terms of the agreement.”288 
While Canadian remediation agreements must contain the fourteen 
provisions discussed above, the agreements “may include, among other 
things,” 289  the following additional provisions: (1) an indication that the 
organization will “implement or enhance compliance measures” to address 
shortcomings in policies, procedures, and training programs within the 
organization that may have allowed misconduct to occur in the first place;290 
(2) an indication that the organization will “reimburse the prosecutor for any 
                                                                                                                            
 278. Id. § 715.34(1)(d).  
 279. Id. § 715.34(1)(e).  
 280. Id. § 715.34(1)(f).  
 281. Id. § 715.34(1)(g).  
 282. Id. § 715.37(5).  
 283. Id. § 715.34(1)(i).  
 284. Id. § 715.34(1)(l).  
 285. Id. § 715.34(1)(m).  
 286. Id. § 715.34(1)(n).  
 287. Id. § 715.34(1)(o).  
 288. Id. § 715.34(1)(p).  
 289. Id. § 715.34(3) (emphasis added). 
 290. Id. § 715.34(3)(a). 
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costs” incurred by the prosecutor relating to “administration” of the 
remediation agreement;291 (3) an indication that an independent monitor has 
been selected, with the prosecutor’s approval, to report to the prosecutor on 
whether the organization has adequately addressed organizational 
compliance shortcomings, and has met other obligations in the agreement as 
identified by the prosecutor;292 and (4) “an indication of the organization’s 
obligations with respect to” any monitor that is appointed, “including the 
obligations to cooperate with the monitor and pay the monitor’s costs.”293 
The proposed legislation is also careful in its attempt to ensure that 
monitors are independent and without conflicts of interest, stating that 
candidates “must notify the prosecutor in writing of any previous or ongoing 
relationship, in particular with the organization or any of its representatives, 
that may have a real or perceived impact on the candidate’s ability to provide” 
an independent assessment of the situation.294 
 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, a DPA must contain a statement of facts regarding 
the alleged offense295 and an indication of the DPA’s expiration date.296 In 
addition, the DPA may include (but is not limited to including) provisions 
requiring the alleged offender:297  (1) to pay a financial penalty298  that is 
“broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed on [the 
offender] on conviction for the alleged offence following a guilty plea”;299 (2) 
“to compensate victims of the alleged offense;”300 (3) “to donate money to a 
charity or other third party;”301 (4) to “disgorge any profits” resulting from 
the alleged wrongdoing;302  (5) to implement or enhance compliance and 
training programs within the organization; 303  (6) to cooperate in 
investigations surrounding the case;304 (7) to pay “any reasonable costs of the 
                                                                                                                            
 291. Id. § 715.34(3)(b). 
 292. Id. § 715.34(3)(c). 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. § 715.35. 
 295. See Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 5(1), sch. 17 (UK). 
 296. See id. § 5(2), sch. 17. 
 297. See id. § 5(3), sch. 17. 
 298. See id. § 5(3)(a), sch. 17. 
 299. Id. § 5(4), sch. 17. 
 300. Id. § 5(3)(b), sch. 17. 
 301. Id. § 5(3)(c), sch. 17. 
 302. Id. § 5(3)(d), sch. 17. 
 303. See id. § 5(3)(e), sch. 17. 
 304. See id. § 5(3)(f), sch. 17. 
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prosecutor” relating to the misconduct or the DPA;305 and (8) to fulfill the 
various requirements imposed on the organization within a specified period 
of time.306 The DPA may also include a provision stating the consequences 
that will occur if an organization fails to comply with its terms.307 
D. Transparency: Publishing DPAs 
Australia 
In Australia, if a DPA is approved, the Director must, within ten days, 
publish the DPA on the Office’s website.308 However, if the Director believes 
it to be “in the interests of justice,”309 he or she can decide to (1) not publish 
the DPA at all,310 or (2) to publish the DPA without disclosing the name of 
the allegedly offending entity “or any other material the Director considers 
should not be disclosed.”311 In deciding not to publish a DPA (or to publish a 
less-than-complete version), the Director must believe that publishing the full 
agreement could be a threat to public safety, could prejudice an ongoing 
investigation, could prejudice the fair trial of an organization, or could go 
against a court order.312 Moreover, the Director has the authority to publish 
the DPA (or a less-than-full version of the DPA) at a later time if he or she 
believes doing so would be in the interests of justice.313 
 
Canada 
In Canada, the court must publish “as soon as practicable” 314  the 
following: (1) the text of any remediation agreement approved by the court;315 
(2) any court order to approve an agreement, to modify an agreement, to 
terminate an agreement due to breach, or to declare that all the terms of an 
agreement have been fulfilled—along with the reasons for making the order 
or for deciding against making the order. 316  However, the court has the 
discretion not to publish, in whole or in part, any agreements, orders, or 
                                                                                                                            
 305. Id. § 5(3)(g), sch. 17. 
 306. See id. § 5(3), sch. 17. 
 307. See id. § 5(5), sch. 17. 
 308. See Crimes Legislation Amendment (Combatting Corporate Crime) Bill 2017 (Cth) sch 
2 pt 2 item 17D(7) (Austl.). 
 309. Id. item 17D(8). 
 310. See id. item 17D(8)(b). 
 311. Id. item 17D(8)(a). 
 312. See id. item 17D(9)(a)–(d). 
 313. See id. item 17D(10). 
 314. Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1, § 715.42(1), S.C. 2018, c 12 (Can.).   
 315. See id. § 715.42 (1)(a). 
 316. See id. § 715.42(1)(b). 
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reasons so long as the court “is satisfied that the non-publication is necessary 
for the proper administration of justice.”317 In making that determination, the 
court must consider (1) society’s interest in encouraging people to report 
crimes;318 (2) society’s interest in encouraging crime victims to participate in 
the criminal justice process;319 (3) “whether it is necessary to protect the 
identity” of the victims or the people involved in bringing the misconduct to 
the government’s attention;320 (4) “the prevention of any adverse effect to any 
ongoing investigation or prosecution;” 321  (5) whether there are effective 
alternatives available to deciding not to publish; 322  (6) the positive and 
negative effects of deciding not to publish;323 and (7) “any other factor that 
the court considers relevant.”324 
 
United Kingdom 
In the U.K., when a DPA is approved by the court, the prosecutor must 
publish the text of the DPA, as well as the results of both the preliminary and 
final hearings on the road to court approval. In other words, the prosecutor 
must publish the court’s declaration from the preliminary hearing and the 
court’s reasons for making it (or the reasons for denying it), as well as the 
court’s declaration from the final hearing, as well as the reasons for making 
it.325 
In addition, transparency of the process is achieved by requiring 
publication of events that might occur after a DPA is approved—including 
(1) breach of the DPA, (2) revision of the agreement, and (3) successful 
completion of all its terms.326 
With respect to a possible breach of the agreement, the various decisions 
that must be made by the Crown Court in such a scenario—including the 
decision of whether or not there has indeed been a breach, whether or not the 
DPA will be terminated due to said breach, and whether or not the court will 
decide to invite the two parties to work on remedying the breach—must be 
                                                                                                                            
 317. Id. § 715.42(2). 
 318. See id. § 715.42(3)(a). 
 319. See id. § 715.42(3)(a). 
 320. Id. § 715.42(3)(b). 
 321. Id. § 715.42(3)(c). 
 322. See id. § 715.42(3)(d). 
 323. See id. § 715.42(3)(e). 
 324. Id. § 715.42(3)(f). 
 325. See Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, § 8(7), sch. 17 (UK). 
 326. Id. §§ 9–11. 
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published by the prosecutor, along with the reasons the court gives for 
arriving at each decision.327 
With respect to revision of the agreement, the prosecutor must publish the 
Crown Court’s decision, including its reasoning, of whether or not to grant 
approval of a revised DPA, as well as the text of the revised agreement if 
approval is granted.328 
With respect to the successful completion of all the terms of the DPA, the 
prosecutor must publish the details of the accused entity’s full compliance 
with the DPA, as well as the facts that the proceedings have been 
discontinued and the matter is considered closed.329 
Importantly, in all the above instances in which the statute mandates the 
prosecutor to publish information, the court has ultimate oversight power 
because it can order the postponement of any publication for whatever period 
of time the court deems appropriate if doing so “is necessary for avoiding a 
substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice in any legal 
proceedings.”330 
E. Summary Observations 
While the details of the DPA programs vary among the three countries, 
there are core ideas that are common to all of them, including: (1) a court or 
officer must review the terms of the agreements to make sure they are 
reasonable and fair; (2) with minor exceptions, the agreements must be 
published and made available to the public for review; and (3) the DPA 
program has been formally implemented through some sort of public 
deliberative process, whether it be a formal legislative process or a public 
consultation process. None of these critical components and protections have 
played a role within the creation or functioning of the U.S. corporate DPA 
program. 
Moreover, the DPA program in the United Kingdom is fairly new, having 
been introduced in 2014. Despite being such a new program, there are already 
indications that the numbers of DPAs used in the U.S. will dwarf the numbers 
used in the U.K. Consider, for example, that between 2010 and 2016, the U.S. 
resolved matters with DPAs (and non-prosecution agreements)331 between 29 
                                                                                                                            
 327. See id. § 9(4)–(7). 
 328. See id. § 9(4), (7), (8). 
 329. See id. § 11(8). 
 330. Id. § 12. 
 331. Although non-prosecution agreements, or NPAs, are similar in form and function to 
DPAs, there is still a difference between them: DPAs are filed in federal court, along with a 
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and 40 times per year (except in 2015, when the number rose to 102),332 while 
the U.K. has used DPAs just four times total in the several years since the 
agreements were introduced in 2014.333 This suggests the U.K. is choosing to 
prosecute cases that, if they had occurred in the U.S., might instead be 
resolved with a DPA. 
One reason for this stark difference might be that DOJ seems to have fairly 
low qualifying standards in offering DPAs—i.e., the government is turning 
to DPAs in instances when it could very well prosecute. In 2015, the Berlin-
based international non-governmental organization Transparency 
International (TI), whose mission is combatting global corruption, published 
a list of factors to consider in determining when out-of-court settlements 
could provide a reasonable alternative to traditional prosecution. 334  TI 
suggested that corporate misconduct should be prosecuted (rather than 
addressed through a settlement) if even one of the following conditions is 
present: (1) if the misconduct “is serious, pervasive, long-lasting and has 
global consequences;” (2) if top management is complicit in the misconduct; 
(3) if the company fails to cooperate with investigations into the misconduct; 
or (4) if the government has strong evidence of wrongdoing and could 
successfully prosecute the case through a trial.335 If the United States were to 
adhere to TI’s recommendations, it is likely that far fewer DPAs would be 
used in addressing allegations of corporate wrongdoing—in fact, the U.S. 
DPA numbers might begin to look more like those in the United Kingdom. 
David Green, the former director of U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office who was 
known for having a “strong bias in favor of prosecution,”336 made it clear 
throughout his tenure as director that DPAs would not be “a mechanism for 
                                                                                                                            
charging document, and they are subject to court approval. NPAs are merely letter agreements 
between DOJ and the target company. When using NPAs, a charge is not filed and the agreement 
is not reviewed by a court. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 110, at 1 n.2. 
 332. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 100, at 2. 
 333. GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, 2017 YEAR-END UPDATE ON CORPORATE NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (NPAS) AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS (DPAS) 8 
(2018) https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2017-year-end-NPA-DPA-
update.pdf (noting that the U.K. had used DPAs only four times since 2014); see also GIBSON, 
DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, supra note 100, at 15 (noting that the U.K. had not used any new DPAs 
since last report). 
 334. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CAN JUSTICE BE ACHIEVED THROUGH SETTLEMENTS? 2 
(Angela McClellan & Craig Fagan eds., 2015), http://files.transparency.org/content/
download/1917/12678/file/2015_PolicyBrief1_Settlements_EN.pdf. 
 335. Id. at 2. In addition, said TI, the settlement should respect the principles of transparency, 
due process, accountability, and victim reparation. Id. at 3–4. 
 336. Robert Amaee, A Close Look at Deferred Prosecution Agreements: US vs. UK, LAW360, 
(Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/972193/a-close-look-at-deferred-prosecution-
agreements-us-vs-uk. 
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a corporate offender to buy itself out of trouble” 337 —something 
commentators have suggested corporate offenders in the U.S. are 
accomplishing through “get-out-of-jail-free cards.”338 
III. TIME FOR CONGRESS TO ACT 
A. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act 
It is now time for the U.S. Congress to pass legislation providing much-
needed reform to the country’s corporate DPA program. Starting in 2009, 
Congress has proposed, several times, legislation to do just that. Entitled the 
Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act (ADPA), the legislation has 
never been enacted into law. 339  The legislation calls for the issuance of 
“public written guidelines” by the Attorney General within ninety days after 
the Act is enacted.340 The guidelines would address a number of important 
areas, including: “[t]he circumstances in which an independent monitor is 
warranted for the agreement”;341“[w]hat terms and conditions are appropriate 
in the agreement”;342 “[t]he process by which the [DOJ] decides that the 
organization has successfully satisfied the terms of the agreement”;343 “[t]he 
manner and method for determining a breach of the agreement”;344 “[t]he 
extent of joint involvement of regulatory agencies in connection with the 
agreement”;345 “[t]he period during which the agreement should remain in 
                                                                                                                            
 337. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: New Guidance 
for Prosecutors (Feb. 14, 2014), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/2014/02/14/deferred-prosecution-
agreements-new-guidance-prosecutors./. 
 338. Senator Elizabeth Warren, Address at the Levy Institute’s 24th Annual Hyman P. 
Minsky Conference: The Unfinished Business of Financial Reform 4 (Apr. 15, 2015), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/files/documents/Unfinished_Business_20150415.pdf (arguing 
that DPAs “were originally created to deal with low-level, non-violent individual offenders, but 
they have now been transformed beyond recognition to create get-out-of-jail-free cards for the 
biggest corporations in the world.”). 
 339. The most recent version was the Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2014, 
H.R. 4540, 113th Cong. (2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/4540/all-info, introduced by Representative Bill Pascrell, Jr. (D., NJ) and co-sponsored by 
Representatives Frank Pallone, Jr. (D., NJ), Steve Cohen (D., TN), and John Conyers, Jr. (D., 
MI). 
 340. Id. § 4(a). 
 341. Id. § 4(b)(1). 
 342. Id. § 4(b)(2). 
 343. Id. § 4(b)(4). 
 344. Id. § 4(b)(5). The Act would enable a court—an objective trier-of-fact—to assure that 
any such termination “is consistent with the interests of justice.” Id. at § 7(c). 
 345. Id. § 4(b)(6). 
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effect”; 346  “[w]hat constitutes the cooperation, if any, required by the 
agreement from the organization and its employees”;347 and “[w]hen and why 
it would be appropriate for Federal prosecutors to enter into a nonprosecution 
agreement rather than a deferred prosecution agreement.”348 
Although all of these are important areas to flesh out, thereby giving 
much-needed guidance and direction to federal prosecutors, the legislation 
fails to mandate that the new guidelines provide direction for the following 
critically important question: What are the specific criteria to be applied in 
determining whether a DPA should be offered? Currently there are no rules 
or clear guidelines governing that determination. 349  We know that 
“[g]overnment is at its most arbitrary when it treats similarly situated people 
differently,” 350  and publishing the criteria prosecutors will use in their 
decision-making process would provide an important check on such 
arbitrariness. Of course, one might argue that publishing this information 
would somehow interfere with prosecutorial discretion; the Fokker appellate 
court makes it clear that “[t]he Executive’s charging authority embraces 
decisions about whether to initiate charges, whom to prosecute, which 
charges to bring, and whether to dismiss charges once brought.”351 However, 
for Congress to mandate the publishing of factors that will be considered in 
a prosecutor’s decision making process would not undercut or interfere with 
prosecutorial authority in actually making a decision; rather, it merely ensures 
decisions will have a measure of consistency and will not be made for 
personal or arbitrary reasons. In the United Kingdom, for example, when a 
prosecutor makes the important determination of whether or not a particular 
prosecution is in the public interest,352 he or she is provided with guiding 
factors, but is then given complete discretion in determining which factors 
are relevant in a given case, and the amount of weight accorded each.353 In 
other words, the prosecutors still have complete discretion, and putting forth 
guidance for them in making their determination does not diminish that 
discretion. The same could be done in the United States. 
In addition, although the bill mandates court review of a DPA to ensure it 
is consistent with the Attorney General’s guidelines “and is in the interests 
                                                                                                                            
 346. Id. § 4(b)(7). 
 347. Id. § 4(b)(8). 
 348. Id. § 4(b)(9). 
 349. Arlen, supra note 25, at 227–28. 
 350. Etelson v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 684 F.2d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
 351. United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 352. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, sch. 17, Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of 
Practice ¶ 2.4 (UK). 
 353. Id. ¶ 2.6. 
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of justice,”354 there are no standards or guidelines set forth for determining 
what would lead a court to deem the DPA to be ‘in the interests of justice.’ 
This same problem exists when the bill states that a court can be asked by a 
party (or by the monitor) to “review the implementation or termination of the 
agreement, and take any appropriate action, to assure that the implementation 
or termination is consistent with the interests of justice.”355 Again, there are 
no standards or guidelines set forth to assist in determining whether a given 
implementation or termination process is ‘consistent with the interests of 
justice.’ Thus, the bill has three fundamental shortcomings: (1) it fails to 
mandate that the guidelines provide specific criteria to be applied by 
prosecutors in deciding when a DPA will be offered; (2) it fails to provide 
standards or guidelines to help courts determine whether a particular DPA is 
in fact ‘in the interests of justice’—which it must be if it is to be approved by 
the court; and (3) in similar fashion, the bill fails to provide standards or 
guidelines to help courts determine whether particular DPA implementation 
or termination processes are in fact ‘consistent with the interests of justice’—
which they must be if they are going to be allowed by the court. In sum, even 
if the bill were to become law, it would contain serious shortfalls in providing 
helpful guidance for prosecutors and courts involved in the corporate DPA 
process. 
B. Ending Too Big to Jail Act 
On March 14, 2018, United States Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced 
legislation to accomplish three goals: create a permanent law enforcement 
agency to investigate crimes at financial institutions; require banks with 
assets of $10 billion or more to conduct periodic due diligence measures to 
prevent financial misconduct; and mandate judicial oversight of DPAs.356 The 
section addressing DPAs mandates that a court would not approve a DPA 
“unless [it] determines that the agreement is in the public interest.”357 In 
making that determination, the court must consider whether reforms listed in 
the DPA are “likely to prevent similar unlawful behavior in the future” and 
whether penalties imposed by the DPA “are sufficient to compensate victims 
and deter future unlawful actions.”358 The bill states that “if the defendant has 
                                                                                                                            
 354. Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2014, H.R. 4540, 113th Cong. § 7(a) 
(2014) (emphasis added). 
 355. Id. § 7(c). 
 356. Ending Too Big to Jail Act, S. 2544, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 357. Id. § 4(2). 
 358. Id. 
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previously been convicted or entered into a [DPA] with the Government in 
connection with related activity, the court may not, without good cause, 
approve such an agreement.”359 The court is also permitted to “review the 
implementation or termination of the [DPA], and take any appropriate 
action, to assure that the implementation or termination is in the public 
interest.”360 Finally, the U.S. Attorney General is directed to publish through 
DOJ’s public website the text of all DPAs between the government and any 
corporate entity, as well as the text of all agreements between the government 
and any independent monitor (unless the court finds “good cause” not to 
make the information available to the public).361 
In summary, the bill mandates that courts not approve DPAs unless they 
are in the public interest, and mandates that courts be given judicial review 
powers to ensure that both the ‘implementation’ and ‘termination’ of DPAs 
are in the public interest as well. While mandating such oversight and review 
would certainly be a step forward in many respects, this broad and general 
language suffers some of the same drawbacks as the language used in the 
Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act discussed above: There are no 
standards or guidelines set forth for determining what would lead a court to 
deem a DPA (or its implementation or termination) to be in the public 
interest.362 Thus, Congress might do well to look to the U.K.’s DPA program, 
which sets forth numerous and detailed public interest-related factors to be 
considered by U.K. prosecutors when choosing between a DPA and 
traditional prosecution.363 In similar fashion, the U.S. Congress could set 
forth a list of issues to be considered by courts when they determine how 
DPA approval, implementation, or termination relates to and impacts the 
public interest.364 Such guidance would assist judges in making decisions 
tending toward objectivity and consistency throughout different cases and 
jurisdictions. 
                                                                                                                            
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. 
 362. It could be argued that federal judges are used to such a situation given that their duties 
currently entail conducting reviews of plea agreements without guidance in deciding whether to 
accept or reject those deals. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3). 
 363. See supra Part II.B. 
 364. Some of these would touch on considerations similar to those set forth in the Principles 
of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 1, § 9-
28.300. 
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C. Learning from Other Countries 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, for one country to import a carbon-
copy of another country’s DPA program due to, among other factors, 
important differences of culture and history, as well as the dictates of each 
country’s current policies and laws, legal precedents, and legislative and 
policy-making processes. However, below are several categories of concern 
that the U.S. Congress should be mindful of should it move forward with 
reforming the nation’s DPA program. 
First, regarding transparency of process surrounding DPA formation—
i.e., to what extent is the public able to participate in watching these deals be 
made? In the United States, these deals are negotiated behind closed doors 
and therefore lack transparency.365  The U.K. has cleverly addressed this 
problem by dividing the process into two separate stages, with the first stage 
purposefully lacking transparency so the entity can be protected from 
publicity should it decide not to move forward with the DPA.366 If, on the 
other hand, it becomes clear to all parties, and to the judge, that an appropriate 
and fair DPA deal can be achieved, then the process is opened up fully to the 
public for scrutiny.367 In the U.K.’s Standard Bank PLC case, the judge makes 
it clear in the text of the agreement that such an arrangement also prevents 
failed DPA negotiations from interfering with a later prosecution: 
 . . . following the commencement of negotiations, the scheme 
mandates that a hearing must be held in private for the purposes of 
ascertaining whether the court will declare that the proposed DPA 
is ‘likely’ to be in the interests of justice and its proposed terms are 
fair, reasonable and proportionate . . . . Reasons must be given and, 
if a declaration is declined, a further application is permitted . . . . 
In that way, the court retains control of the ultimate outcome and, if 
the agreement is not approved, the possibility of prosecution is not 
jeopardised as a consequence of any publicity that would follow if 
these proceedings had not been held in private.368 
Second, regarding transparency of the DPA agreements themselves—i.e., 
to what extent will the agreements be made accessible to the general public? 
It should be required that all DPAs be made available to the public through 
publishing—ideally on the government’s website. Currently, not all DPA 
                                                                                                                            
 365. MIKE KOEHLER, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT IN A NEW ERA 64 (2014). 
 366. Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, sch. 17, Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of 
Practice ¶ 1.2 (UK). 
 367. Id.  
 368. Serious Fraud Office v. Standard Bank PLC [2015] EWHC (QB) No. U20150854 [2] 
(Eng.). 
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agreements employed by the U.S. government are made publicly available, 
sometimes prompting lawsuits to gain access.369 Although the agreements do 
not provide formal judicial precedent as would a court opinion, they 
nevertheless provide important guidance to business entities, helping them 
clarify what is (and what is not) acceptable conduct under a given statute.370 
In addition to publishing the DPA agreements themselves, the government 
websites could publish periodic updates on their implementation—right up 
until the time when either a breach in the agreement is declared, or when it is 
determined that all agreement terms have been met and charges are therefore 
being dismissed. Since there are potential privacy concerns involved, more 
research should be conducted to determine if some kinds of information 
would need to be redacted or otherwise kept from public view.371 
Third, regarding standardization of agreements: There has been 
longstanding criticism that U.S. prosecutors are given too little guidance in 
formulating DPA agreement terms,372 with one commentator saying current 
policy gives prosecutors a “roving commission to do good.”373 There must be 
a balance to the large amount of discretion prosecutors have in deciding DPA 
agreement terms. In short, there needs to be an increased standardization of 
DPA agreements. This could be achieved through the Congressionally 
mandated use of written guidance answering questions central to all cases 
potentially resolved with a DPA, e.g., what criteria and standards will be used 
in calculating the fine?; what types of compliance program changes might be 
required of the entity?; what considerations will be used in determining how 
many months or years the DPA agreement will run?; what factors will be 
evaluated in deciding whether the agreement has been breached, or has been 
                                                                                                                            
 369. Williamson, supra note 111. 
 370. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Essay, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the 
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 500 (1985) (“When an authoritative 
ruling is necessary, . . . the courts must adjudicate and provide clear guidance for all . . . .”); see 
Barry J. Pollack & Annie Wartanian Reisinger, Lone Wolf or the Start of a New Pack: Should the 
FCPA Guidance Represent a New Paradigm in Evaluating Corporate Criminal Liability Risks?, 
51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121, 127 (2014) (noting that because DPAs do not provide formal judicial 
precedent as would a court opinion, “the DOJ is under no obligation to treat the same conduct by 
different corporations with any consistency, increasing the challenges of corporate compliance 
and risk reduction.”). One commentator makes the somewhat cynical, but possibly truthful, 
suggestion that DOJ uses DPAs because it “strategically keep[s] the law underdeveloped in order 
to place more pressure on corporations.” Brooks, supra note 36, at 139 n.22. 
 371. Some of these questions have been addressed in United States v. HSBC Bank, 863 F.3d 
125 (2d Cir. 2017), which held that DPAs are not judicial documents and are therefore not subject 
to a presumptive right of public access. 
 372. See Arlen, supra note 25, at 221 (noting that “[i]ndividual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices are 
free to make their own decisions about when to impose a mandate and what form it should take”). 
 373. Coffee, supra note 47. 
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successfully completed?; what criteria will be used in appointing a 
monitor?374 Of course, there are resources and standards currently employed 
in other contexts that can provide at least preliminary guidance—for 
example, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines can help in calculating fine ranges 
and creating effective compliance programs.375 
Fourth, regarding flexibility versus certainty: There will always be an 
inherent tension between flexibility and certainty surrounding the corporate 
DPA. On one side is the government, wanting flexibility to draft DPA 
agreement terms that it deems appropriate. On the other side is the corporate 
entity, wanting a sense of the parameters within which the final deal will be 
set, thereby providing some sense of predictability and outcome-certainty.376 
One change the Congress might consider is to provide more protection to a 
defendant whose DPA ends up being rejected by the district court. Currently, 
DPAs almost always include an admission of wrongdoing by the 
defendant.377 Even if the DPA is rejected by the court, that admission can still 
be used by the government if it decides to pursue prosecution. One possible 
solution to this problem is for the enactment, in the DPA context, of a 
provision similar to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(5).378 That 
provision, in the context of a plea bargain, allows a defendant to withdraw a 
                                                                                                                            
 374. Note that some guidance has already been set forth in two separate internal DOJ 
memoranda. See Morford Memorandum, supra note 110; modified by Memorandum from Gary 
G. Grindler, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., on Additional Guidance on the Use of Monitors in 
Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations (May 25, 
2010). 
 375. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2008), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2008/manual/GL2008.pdf. The 
Sentencing Guidelines were used in calculating fines in Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, 
United States v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 16-516 (E.D.N.Y. 2016), and in Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement at 6–7, United States v. Latam Airlines Grp., No. 16-60195 (S.D. Fla. 
2016).  
 376. See Amaee, supra note 336 (discussing how the U.S. DPA model “places considerable 
discretion and authority in the hands of the U.S. prosecutor,” which can “give a company a higher 
degree of certainty as to the negotiated outcome”). 
 377.  Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on 
the Justice Department’s Corporate Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1310 n.116 (2014) 
(“An admission of wrongdoing is standard fare in the modern DPA.”); see Sarah Kelly-Kilgore 
& Emily M. Smith, Corporate Criminal Liability, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 421, 453 n.227 (2011) 
(discussing how an admission of wrongdoing in a DPA “will be admissible in subsequent civil 
litigation and disclosures will likely be discoverable.”). 
 378.  Such a change to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would likely have to be made 
not by Congress, but by the Supreme Court of the United States. Authority to establish rules of 
criminal procedure was given to the Supreme Court in 1940 through the Sumners Courts Act. 
Sumners Courts Act of 1940, 76 Pub. L. No. 76-675, 54 Stat. 688 (1940) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 3771 (2015)). 
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guilty plea if the plea agreement is rejected by the court under Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(3)(A). Allowing a defendant to withdraw an 
admission of wrongdoing in the context of a DPA seems only fair given that 
the DPA rejection by the court would deprive the defendant of all other 
benefits from the agreement. Such a change would be especially important if 
the Congress, in reforming this area of law, empowers district courts to 
approve or reject DPAs based on a substantive review of the deal terms—an 
action that would likely lead to increased numbers of DPA rejections by the 
courts. 
Fifth, regarding oversight for the life of the agreement: Current policy 
dictates that the government, and only the government, determines if a DPA 
has been breached by the defendant during the deferral period—a decision 
that is not reviewable by the court.379 However, the court should be called 
upon to review that determination of breach, thereby serving as a check and 
balance on the government’s power. Furthermore, although the law remains 
unclear regarding a court’s power to continue its involvement with a DPA (or 
with the assigned monitor) after the agreement has initially been approved,380 
there needs to be an independent entity, such as a court, that is responsible 
for overseeing and monitoring the DPA process from start to finish. 
Moreover, to the extent practicable, the public should be informed of the 
degree to which a company is (or is not) successfully working toward meeting 
the terms of the DPA. One can easily see how the government—the party that 
drafted the DPA agreement with a company—might not have a strong 
incentive to accurately report to the public that the deal is not unfolding well. 
For these same reasons, why should the prosecutor alone, without review or 
oversight, get to make the determination regarding if and when all the DPA 
agreement terms have been met and it is therefore time to end the deferral 
period and withdraw all charges? These issues quickly venture into territory 
that is beyond the scope of this Article. And yet, the topic goes to the Article’s 
core criticism of the U.S. DPA program: there is too much government 
discretion involved, without enough judicial oversight and review. There 
needs to be additional investigation conducted, by both academics and policy 
makers, regarding oversight for the life of the DPA agreement. 
                                                                                                                            
 379. See Xian, supra note 6, at 644–45 (“These agreements often include provisions in which 
the government is listed as the sole decider as to whether a breach has occurred. As a result, the 
question of whether a company actually breached the agreement is not subject to an objective 
trier-of-fact’s judgment, but posed to the government, which might have an ancillary interest in 
protecting the status of ‘successful’ [DPAs].” (footnote omitted)). 
 380. See Mike Scarcella, Court Urged to Reject ‘Blanket Sealing’ of Monitor’s Report in 
HSBC Case; The Second Circuit Case Tests the Secrecy of Compliance Reports, NAT’L L.J., (Oct. 
21, 2016), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/3c498595-e783-4add-82d9-ae6cdfb095c1/
?context=1000516.  
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Sixth, regarding cost: Proponents of DPAs argue the agreements can lead 
to significant cost-savings when compared to traditional litigation because 
they do not require various expenditures associated with trials (e.g., 
organizing juries, providing court personnel such as bailiffs, court reporters 
and transcribers, etc.). The agreements will oftentimes mandate that the 
defendant company carry out internal investigations that are to be shared with 
the government as part of the process. Although these company-funded 
investigations save taxpayers from spending limited resources, should these 
private investigations be trusted as being comprehensive, appropriately 
aggressive, and competently performed? As Professor Katrice Bridges 
Copeland argues, “The notion that the corporation should perform the 
prosecutor’s function of investigating, identifying, and providing evidence 
against the wrongdoer within the corporation is ludicrous.” 381  Given the 
obvious incentives at play for a company to shield itself and its employees 
from criminal liability, it would seem likely that the government would yield 
far more reliable results by conducting its own investigations.382 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, when the U.S. judicial system has turned to alternative 
dispute resolution tools such as plea bargaining, settlement agreements, and 
consent decrees, those mechanisms have included ample oversight from 
courts to protect the parties, to protect the public interest, and to act as a check 
on prosecutorial power. Because the government has tremendous power 
when using DPAs in the corporate context—including the ability to act as 
accuser, judge, jury, and probation officer—there must be meaningful 
judicial review of those agreements. Unfortunately, precedent from two 
federal circuit court rulings not only prevents meaningful judicial review, but 
can also, as described in this Article, make district courts feel compelled to 
approve a DPA even when the court believes the agreement is overly lenient 
toward the defendant. (Of course, it would be equally problematic if the 
district court believed the DPA was overly harsh toward a defendant. In 
either case, the harm stems from circuit court rulings compelling district 
courts to approve DPAs that those courts would otherwise likely reject). 
Rule-of-law and separation-of-power principles call for the U.S. Congress 
to now step in and reform the nation’s corporate DPA program. First, 
Congress should mandate that courts provide meaningful review of the terms 
                                                                                                                            
 381. Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Yates Memo: Looking for ‘Individual Accountability’ in 
All the Wrong Places, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1897, 1924 (2017). 
 382. See id. 
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of all DPA agreements to ensure reasonableness and fairness for the parties 
and public. Second, Congress should give more guidance to the government 
regarding when—i.e., under what kinds of circumstances—DPAs are 
permitted to be offered, to ensure that DPAs are not contributing to the 
creation of a dual system of justice. Currently, there are no rules or clear 
guidelines governing when DPAs will or will not be offered to a defendant. 
Although that kind of unfettered prosecutorial power is acceptable when there 
are checks and balances in place to constrain prosecutors’ actions and 
decisions (e.g., judges, juries, and proceedings that can be viewed by the 
public and reported on by the press), no such checks and balances exist for 
DPAs. With that much discretion being accorded the government, the 
following situations can occur: a large company can be offered a DPA when 
a smaller company engaging in the same misconduct is not; employees of 
large firms can be offered DPAs when employees of small firms are not—
even when all the wrongdoers are engaging in the same misconduct; or 
wealthy criminals can be offered DPAs when poor criminals are not—even 
when everyone is committing the same crime. Congress must ensure that 
DPAs are not permitted to play a role in creating this kind of unconstitutional 
dual system of justice. 
Third, there needs to be more research and investigation into the degree to 
which DPAs are effective (or not) as tools of law enforcement. The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office has concluded the government currently 
has no measures to assess DPA effectiveness,383 and this needs to change; 
resources need to be committed to finding a way to determine whether the 
agreements are as effective as other tools and processes (such as plea 
agreements or traditional courtroom trials) in achieving the general purposes 
of the criminal law—i.e., deterring criminal behavior and punishing it when 
it occurs, protecting the public from criminal conduct, rehabilitating bad 
actors, and providing restitution for victims. Information presented in this 
paper suggests DPAs might be less effective compared to other tools, 
especially regarding deterrence, but more investigative work needs to be 
completed before a true comparison among the various tools can be made. In 
the end, if it is found that DPAs are in fact less effective than other crime-
fighting tools, it might nevertheless be decided that economic and other 
efficiencies stemming from their use are worth the tradeoff in decreased law 
enforcement. Unfortunately, these kinds of calculations and weighing of 
options cannot be made due to lack of information. 
Finally, it must be determined if the reasoning the government relies upon 
to justify using DPAs in the corporate context can be empirically validated. 
                                                                                                                            
 383. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 29, at 20. 
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For example, prosecutors have indicated that a major driving force in 
choosing DPAs over traditional litigation is the belief that indictment alone, 
in the context of a traditional prosecution, can lead to a company’s ruin—
with negative impacts on innocent parties like employees, customers, and 
shareholders. But is this belief in fact correct, or is it an overblown myth? 
Evidence presented in this Article suggests the latter but, again, complete and 
accurate information is necessary. Unfortunately, it appears that prosecutorial 
decision-making with respect to corporate DPAs might currently be overly 
influenced by anecdote, speculation, and myth. This needs to change. 
It is telling that nearly every country outside the United States that is now 
in the process of drafting or implementing its own DPA program has decided 
that (1) a court or similar officer must be allowed to review the terms of the 
agreements to ensure they are reasonable and fair, (2) that all agreements 
must, with minor exceptions, be made available to the general public through 
publication, and (3) that the DPA program will be formally created and 
enacted through some sort of deliberative process, whether it be a formal 
legislative process or a public consultation process. The United States has 
failed in all three regards: there is no meaningful judicial review of DPA 
agreement terms; there are no legal or policy mandates ensuring that all DPAs 
are published and made publicly available; and the program within the United 
States, rather than being subjected to the rigors of the legislative process and 
ultimately signed into law, has evolved internally within DOJ, with guidance 
given mostly through the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual.384 This means the only 
guidance given to U.S. prosecutors in deciding whether to offer a DPA, and 
in deciding the terms of that agreement, are the general standards and 
considerations set forth within the Principles of Federal Prosecution of 
Business Organizations.385 It is little wonder why so many foreign countries 
are rejecting U.S.-style corporate DPAs as they work to fashion their own 
programs. Congress must now act. Failing to address U.S. DPA rule-of-law 
and separation-of-power shortcomings will continue to undermine respect for 
U.S. law, both domestically and abroad. 
                                                                                                                            
 384. The only role Congress played in creating the U.S. DPA program was to include certain 
exclusions as part of the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2008)). In other words, 
while the Act mandates that a defendant’s trial begin within seventy days after the government 
files an indictment, it also allows for certain exclusions from that seventy day limit, such as “[a]ny 
period of delay during which prosecution is deferred by the attorney for the Government pursuant 
to written agreement with the defendant, with the approval of the court, for the purpose of 
allowing the defendant to demonstrate his good conduct.” This exemption, under 18 U.S.C. § 
3161(h)(2), enables the government to resolve maters using DPAs. 
 385. U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 1, § 9-28.300. 
